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A PAST AND FUTURE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS:
THE CASE OF MONTANA
Anthony Johnstone*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial elections are approaching their second century in
the United States, and they are not going away anytime soon.
After the rise of Jacksonian Democracy in the early nineteenth
century, and popular calls for increased judicial independence
from the political branches, most states hard-wired the election
of judges into state constitutions.1 Despite reform efforts that
emerged in the twentieth century and continue today, states that
hold judicial elections reliably reject alternative selection
methods. Nearly ninety percent of state judges in the United
States are subject to election.2
Recent deregulation of campaigns and elections through
successful constitutional challenges now has reached judicial
campaigns and elections. Many of the legal and ethical
constraints on judicial campaign speech and finance, once a
realm of electoral exceptionalism respecting the distinct office

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. The author served as
counsel for the State of Montana in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (as
amicus) and American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock. Thanks to Dmitry Bam, Jean
Bowman, Larry Howell, Greg Munro, James Nelson, James Sample and Jeff Wiltse for
insightful comments, to Zachary Rogala and Anne Sherwood for helpful research
assistance, and to my family for their support..
1. For a recent account of this history emphasizing the role of post-Jacksonian
financial crises, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010).
2. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J.
1077 (2007). Schotland reports that “[o]f all state judges (appellate and general-jurisdiction
trial courts), 89% . . . face the voters in some type of election. Facing contestable elections
are 60% . . . of our appellate judges and 80% . . . of our trial judges; facing only retention
elections are another 26% of appellate and 9% of trial judges.” Id. at 1105.
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of a judge, fell to these challenges alongside their politicalcampaign analogues. The remaining exceptions, which protect a
core of judicial impartiality from due process violations, are
inconsequential to most modern judicial campaigns. These
campaigns quickly learned the political tactics of the Citizens
United era, prompting a flood of attack ads financed by
independent expenditures, some of which are not fully
disclosed.3
Meanwhile, state courts in general, and state supreme
courts in particular, remain important players in increasingly
polarized debates concerning state law and politics. One-party
state legislatures and executive branches, encouraged by
historically large legislative margins,4 test state courts with
contentious laws and constitutional questions. In states where a
balance of power once encouraged political compromise, the
losing party now may resort to litigation. The same moneyed
interests that help set the legislative agenda also loom over state
courts. Those judges and justices must decide the high-stakes
and politically charged cases that follow, knowing their
decisions may set the course for their next election campaigns.
A moderate judge who does not line up neatly with moneyed
interests on one side or the other risks electoral defeat. Case by
case, issue by issue, term by term, the polarization of the
political branches runs to the courts.
This is the new normal in judicial elections. It follows the
new normal in political elections of the Citizens United era.
Judicial candidates seeking to interpret the laws are nearly as
free to speak on legal and political issues as are the legislative
candidates seeking to write the laws. Even in traditionally non-

3. See generally Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the
federal government may not suppress political speech by banning corporate expenditures
for electioneering, but that it may require donors both to identify themselves in materials
that they underwrite and to disclose campaign-related expenditures in excess of established
thresholds); see also SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–2014 at 1 (2015) (“Over the last decade and a half,
state Supreme Court elections have been transformed into politicized and costly contests,
dominated by special interests seeking to shape courts to their liking.”).
4. See Karl Kurtz, These Unified States, STATE LEGISLATURES MAGAZINE (May
2013) (“For the first time in more than 50 years, one party controls both chambers of the
legislature and the governor's’ office in 37 states—Republicans in 23 states, Democrats in
14.”).
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partisan judicial elections, political parties may be as free to
endorse judicial candidates as they are to endorse political
candidates. Campaign-contribution laws limit donations to
candidates’ campaigns, judicial or political, but face renewed
challenges. Corporations and unions are as free to spend
unlimited amounts of shareholder and member funds on
independent expenditures in judicial campaigns, just as they
may in political campaigns. Contributors are free to choose their
preferred levels of disclosure by selecting among candidate
campaigns, super PACs, or less transparent vehicles. Careful
contributors may enjoy significant influence in candidate
campaigns—judicial or political—without triggering either a
disqualifying conflict or even the obligation to identify
themselves.
Montana’s 2014 election for one of two contested seats on
the state supreme court exemplifies this new normal. In 2011,
the Montana Supreme Court took a lonely stand against this
state of affairs by attempting to distinguish Montana’s
campaigns, including judicial campaigns, from the presidential
campaign addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United. But that principled stand was short-lived, drawing a
quick and brief rebuke from the Supreme Court. Despite state
concerns about financial and outside influence on judicial
campaigns that date back a century and a half, and their
continued relevance to judicial politics today, the Supreme
Court so far has refused to grapple with the implications of
Citizens United for elected judges.
This article searches for lessons from Montana’s experience
for the future of American judicial elections. Part II considers
the origin of judicial elections and history of reforms in
Montana, which is marked both by substantial worries about
outside political intervention in state courts and by several
innovative responses to it. Part III reviews the practice
established by Montana’s reformed model of judicial selection
over the past four decades. Part IV examines the Montana
Supreme Court’s engagement with Citizens United, followed by
a close analysis of an election held in its aftermath: the hardfought 2014 campaign between incumbent Justice Mike Wheat
and challenger Lawrence VanDyke. Part V suggests some
preliminary conclusions about the meaning of Citizens United
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and other recent legal developments for judicial elections in the
states, and how states might respond.
II. A HISTORY OF MONTANA’S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
AND JUDICIAL-ELECTION REFORMS
Judicial selection in Montana is both distinct from and
representative of its practice across the states. Montana’s 150year-old judiciary began in territorial days, when outside judges
appointed in Washington, D.C., produced resentment among
Montanans even as these territorial judges helped the new
territory develop toward statehood. The state’s first constitution
responded to this popular resentment by providing for judicial
elections. In the Progressive Era, the state adopted typical
campaign-finance and nonpartisan election reforms, but only
after exceptional agonies of corporate corruption. By the second
half of the twentieth century, Montana had joined many other
states in reconsidering judicial elections, though it did so
through the extraordinary means of popular deliberation through
a constitutional convention. Montana, in short, is a microcosm
of judicial election reform in the American states.
A. The Territorial Origins of Montana’s Elected Judiciary
Twenty-five years of territorial status forged Montana’s
attitude toward its courts. In the gold rush that opened
Montana’s territorial history, customary miners’ courts and the
storied vigilantes dispensed civil and criminal justice.5
Territorial justices, appointed by the President, “owed allegiance
to the federal government and to political parties, yet at the same
5. For a sympathetic overview of customary legal institutions in the American West
from a public-choice perspective, see Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen:
Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 581 (1998). See generally FREDERICK ALLEN, A DECENT ORDERLY LYNCHING: THE
MONTANA VIGILANTES (2004). For a colorful contemporary account of the vigilantes, see
THOMAS J. DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA: POPULAR JUSTICE IN THE ROCKY
MOUNTAINS (1953). Even today, the Montana Highway Patrol patch features the
vigilantes’ mysterious warning “3-7-77,” in “a tribute to the Vigilantes, the first law
enforcement group in the Montana Territory.” Montana Department of Justice, History of
the Montana Highway Patrol, https://dojmt.gov/highwaypatrol/history-of-the-montanahighway-patrol/ (2015) (indicating that the numbers were added to the patch in 1956).
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time were not insensitive to pressures within the territory
itself.”6 These tensions played out when Territorial Secretary
Thomas Meagher, a Union Democrat serving as acting governor,
pushed for statehood in 1866 with a constitutional convention
and two extraordinary legislative sessions. When a two-member
majority of the territorial court, both Republicans, declared the
acts of the extraordinary sessions null and void, the state
legislature redistricted those justices to the wilderness. Congress
responded with a rare nullification of all laws enacted in the
extraordinary sessions. To make clear its “irritation toward the
Democratic populace of this ill-mannered western province,” the
Republican Congress also revoked the legislature’s judicial
districting power and raised the territorial judges’ salaries by
$1000.7
Once the territorial government settled in, “Montana gained
recognition as having one of the most efficient court systems
among western territories.”8 Yet territorial justices were
“[h]ampered . . . by an unfamiliarity with mining law, and by
resentment stemming from local political cleavages and the
dislike of ‘foreign’ officials.”9 Despite the quality of some
territorial justices, residents chafed at their lack of democratic
legitimacy.10 Montanans complained about “‘breaking in’
pilgrim Judges from Eastern States who have known nothing of
our people, laws and customs.”11 On the eve of the second
Montana constitutional convention in 1884, one newspaper
editorial captured the popular complaint that
[t]he President has nominated another carpetbagger for
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Montana.
Seventy-five thousand people in the Territory to make laws

6. CLARK C. SPENCE, TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA,
1864–89 at 212 (1975).
7. Id. at 43–45.
8. MICHAEL P. MALONE, RICHARD B. ROEDER & WILLIAM L. LANG, MONTANA: A
HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 110 (1991).
9. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 231.
10. Andrew P. Morriss, Opting for Change or Continuity? Thinking About ‘Reforming’
the Judicial Article of Montana’s Constitution, 72 MONT. L. REV. 27, 39–40 (2011).
11. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 218 (quotations omitted).

52

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

for themselves, and a Hoosier sent out from Indiana to tell
us what we have done. How long, oh Lord; how long!12

The proposed 1884 Constitution, the unsuccessful
predecessor of the 1889 Constitution that secured statehood,
reflected this suspicion of outside influence. In its memorial to
Congress, the convention sought statehood to redress “the policy
which has so long prevailed of sending strangers to rule over us
and fill our offices.”13 The convention’s address to voters
detailed the grievances. Notably, the address devoted more lines
to the Judicial Department than it devoted to the legislative and
executive branches combined. The proposed judicial system
responded to popular distrust of outsider territorial justices:
The present system is manifestly wrong again; by it the
people have no voice in selecting the judges. They are sent
to us from the far off East, probably in deference to the
traditional idea that it was from thence all of the “wise
men” came. . . . The character of our litigation is such that,
however learned in the law our eastern judge may be, he
will find himself much embarrassed in his new field.14

Under the proposed state constitution, justices would be “elected
by the people” for six-year terms, and would be “required to
have resided in the State or Territory at least two years prior to
their election.”15
When Montana finally attained statehood in 1889, the
convention’s address to voters16 was shorter, as the Constitution
proposed was similar in all its fundamental provisions to the
Constitution of 1884, which had been ratified by a large
majority.17 Still, the judicial provisions retained primary
importance as the only article specifically recommended in the
address: “yet we think in this the judiciary system is better
suited to the wants and interests of our people.”18 The 1889
Constitution contained several stylistic and procedural changes,
12. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 111.
13. MONT. CONST. of 1884 (proposed), Memorial.
14. Id., Address 3.
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
16. See text accompanying note 14, supra, for an excerpt from the text of the address
accompanying the judicial article of the proposed 1884 constitution.
17. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. 75.
18. Id.
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but retained the elected terms and residency requirements for
justices.19
B. The Copper Kings and Their Influence on Montana’s
Judicial Elections Today
With statehood, Montana’s judiciary transitioned from
federal appointees unfamiliar with mining law to elected
officials all too familiar with the corporate overreach and
corruption that came to be known as the War of the Copper
Kings. The mining industry matured with outside investment of
capital from the so-called Copper Kings: the 1884 and 1889
Constitutional Convention President (and disgraced United
States Senator) William A. Clark; the head of the giant
Anaconda Copper Mining Company Marcus Daly; and the
aggressive young industrialist F. Augustus Heinze.
These larger-than-life personalities engaged in a decadeslong struggle for domination of Butte’s “richest hill on earth,”20
and incidental to that struggle, for control of the state’s
government—including its courts.21 The Montana Supreme
Court once recounted the broad history of “[t]hose tumultuous
years . . . marked by rough contests for political and economic
domination primarily in the mining center of Butte, between
mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign trusts or
corporations.”22 Some of those rough contests played out before
19. Id., art. VIII, §§ 6–7, 10.
20. Larry Howell, “Purely the Creature of the Inventive Genius of the Court”: State ex
rel. Whiteside and the Creation and Evolution of the Montana Supreme Court’s Unique
and Controversial Writ of Supervisory Control, 69 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (explaining
that the War of the Copper Kings occurred “at a time when the spread of electricity and
telephones made copper one of the world’s most important natural resources”).
21. For the classic account, see C. B. GLASSCOCK, THE WAR OF THE COPPER KINGS
(1935). A detailed contemporary telling is MICHAEL P. MALONE, THE BATTLE FOR BUTTE:
MINING & POLITICS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1864–1906 (1995). The canonical story
is summarized in MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 201–31. Scholars have
recently reconsidered the consequences of the era for current legal questions. See Howell,
supra note 20; Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West, Citizens United, Caperton,
and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 MONT. L. REV. 25 (2012); Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of
Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete History, 73 MONT. L. REV. 299
(2012).
22. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney General 271 P.3d 1, 8 (2011), rev’d sub nom.
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
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elected state judges, and provide a backdrop for judicial
elections in Montana today.
Clark and Daly feuded mainly in the political arena. In the
1894 “Capital Fight,” Clark’s Helena bested Daly’s Anaconda to
win the designation of state capitol.23 Clark won his 1899 United
States Senate campaign, but resigned shortly after taking office
when a Senate committee found evidence that he had bribed
state legislators on a massive scale.24 Montana Attorney General
C. B. Nolan then explained that the local grand jury would not
indict Clark because “the people of said county felt that they
were discharging an obligation due to the said Clark on account
of the assistance rendered to the said county of Lewis and
Clarke in the selection of the city of Helena as the state
capital.”25
The corruption didn’t stop there: Once the court accepted
the case, Clark supporters approached all three justices with
overtures ranging from ex parte conversations to an offer of a
$100,000 bribe.26 The justices “did not pursue any official legal
recourse against the persons attempting to influence them,
deciding that exposing the effort would reflect poorly on the
reputation of the Court.”27 They only reluctantly testified to the
attempted bribery under subpoena from the Senate Committee
on Privileges and Elections in its investigation of Clark’s
election, providing important evidence in support of the
Committee’s recommendation not to seat Senator Clark.28
Heinze waged a more focused battle, largely in the courts,
to extend his mining holdings in Butte and defend them against
industry consolidation by the Amalgamated Copper Company,

23. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 213–14.
24. Id. at 218–21. The bribery came before the Montana Supreme Court in disbarment
proceedings against Clark’s lawyer and bribery bagman John B. Wellcome, during which
the Court initially dismissed the petition because the crimes charged against Wellcome had
not been prosecuted. See In re Wellcome, 58 P. 45, 45, 47 (1899). Election of United States
Senators by popular vote did not become law until 1913. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
(providing that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, elected by the people thereof”).
25. Wellcome, 58 P. at 49.
26. Howell, supra note 20, at 41.
27. Id. at 40.
28. Id. at 42–44.
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which had purchased Daly’s Anaconda interests in 1889.29
Heinze met mixed results as a defendant in federal court,30 and
through a series of corporate maneuverings turned to state
court,31 where he could more easily influence the judges. In
1900, with his support for the re-election of William Clancy and
the election of Edward Harney for the Second Judicial District
Court, the state trial court with jurisdiction over Butte, Heinze
did just that.32 For their four-year terms, “[w]ith his allies sitting
on the local courts, Heinze could easily drive the titans of
Standard Oil to absurd lengths” of vexatious litigation that kept
Amalgamated—a holding company formed by Standard Oil
officers—at bay while Heinze, sometimes literally, mined ore
out from under the company’s feet.33 Indeed, “in a burlesque of
judicial dignity, William Clancy found in Heinze’s favor with
monotonous regularity.”34
After years of delaying cases to the strategic advantage of
Heinze, Judge Clancy dealt two devastating blows to
Amalgamated on October 22, 1903: first, awarding ownership of
the strategically crucial Minnie Healy mine from Amalgamated
to Heinze; and second, enjoining the Amalgamated from holding
its Montana subsidiaries.35 Amalgamated responded in kind,
shutting down its Montana operations and throwing more than
15,000 employees out of work.36 Governor Joseph Toole,
elected in 1900 with the support of Clark and Heinze, eventually
capitulated to Amalgamated’s demand. He called a special

29. MALONE, supra note 21, at 140, 142 (1995) (explaining that even against the litigious standards of early American mining, “[w]hat happened at Butte . . . seemed to be in a
class by itself,” a “carnival of litigation” costing thousands of jobs and tens of millions of
dollars at the turn of the twentieth century, in large part because Heinze, who earned a reputation as a “court-house miner,” employed a legal force of thirty-seven attorneys).
30. See, e.g., Morse v. Montana Ore-Purchasing Co., 105 F. 337, 348 (D. Mont. 1900)
(“[U]pon the ground that there was undue influence exerted as to the jury by the
objectionable publications [by the anti-Amalgamated Helena press], the court will grant a
new trial.”).
31. MALONE, supra note 21, at 142–43.
32. Howell, supra note 20, at 34–41.
33. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 226.
34. K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 199 (1959).
35. MALONE, supra note 21, at 173 (reporting that Judge Clancy then announced he
would “break away to the woods tomorrow” for hunting).
36. Id. at 172–73.
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session to enact an unprecedented “Fair Trials” law allowing the
peremptory substitution of a district judge.37
Heinze turned his attention to the Montana Supreme Court
in 1904, reportedly offering Congressman Joseph Dixon a bribe
to support an opponent to Chief Justice Theodore Brantly.38
Chief Justice Brantly was then showing “unimpeachable
integrity during . . . corrupt times” as he completed his first
term, and would go on to become Montana’s longest-serving
Chief Justice.39 Thus, Brantly was re-elected and Heinze’s
Judges Clancy and Harney lost. Heinze “lost the war when he
lost control of the courts,” and sold out to Amalgamated in
1906.40
Progressive opposition to the Company solidified with the
consolidation of economic power in the Amalgamated,
eventually completed by its purchase of Clark’s mining interests
in 1910. Sweeping political reforms included a constitutional
amendment providing for initiative and referendum in 1906 and
a series of electoral reforms in 1912 including a Corrupt
Practices Act.41 During the politically tumultuous years in
between, the Montana legislature attempted to reform judicial
elections by providing for non-partisan nominations. Previously
judges ran for office like other elected officials, through
nominations by political parties.42 In 1909 the legislature
enacted a short law that limited judicial candidates to
nominations by citizen petition to the exclusion of nominations
by party convention or primary.43 Chief Justice Brantly won his
37. Id. at 177–79; see generally W. William Leaphart, First Right of Recusal, 72
MONT. L. REV. 287, 287–89 (2011). A one-substitution variation of the law, still called the
“Clancy Law,” remains in effect, providing that “[e]ach adverse party is entitled to one
substitution of a district judge.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804(1) (2015).
38. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note, 8 at 229.
39. Howell, supra note 20, at 16 n.104.
40. MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 229.
41. See Wiltse, supra note 21.
42. See 1895 Mont. Pol. Code §§ 1310–1320 (addressing methods of nomination,
certification of nominees, and related subjects).
43. See An Act to Provide for Non-Partisan Nominations for Judicial Offices, 1909
MONT. LAWS 160 ch. 113 11th Leg. Assembly (Mont. 1909); see also Montana Judicial
Branch, Brief History of the Montana Judicial Branch, http://courts.mt.gov/supreme/
history (characterizing the law as “a brief and largely forgotten experiment in nonpartisan
judicial elections”) (accessed August 18, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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second reelection in the first non-partisan election held in 1910,
though only by winning a plurality of 12,493 votes in a fourcandidate race that drew a total of 31,960—a ballot falloff of
more than half from the 65,774 votes cast for the congressional
seat.44
In 1911, a Republican candidate for Butte police judge
challenged the non-partisan election reform, and the state
supreme court (all Republican justices) voted two-to-one to
invalidate the law due to constitutional defects in the law’s title
and transition process.45 In 1935, at the height of the New Deal
and the Democratic Party’s unprecedented dominance over state
politics,46 including a sweep of the supreme court,47 the
legislature brought non-partisan judicial elections back for good
with a more comprehensive reform.48
The War of the Copper Kings left lasting scars on the
integrity of state government in Montana, including its courts.
Shortly after it ended, President Roosevelt’s Solicitor General
worried about bringing the so-called smoke-wars litigation to
end the deadly pollution of forest and farmlands by
Amalgamated’s smelter, noting that “[t]he suit will be filed in a
territory which has heretofore been the battleground between the
Amalgamated and Heinze interests . . . where open confessions
44. ELLIS WALDRON, AN ATLAS OF MONTANA POLITICS SINCE 1864 at 130, 134
(1958). When he ran as a Republican in 1904, Brantly alone garnered 30,956 votes in a
race with little ballot falloff, perhaps due to the party labels. Id. at 108, 113 (reporting
65,765 total votes for governor and 63,026 total votes for chief justice). “The spectacular
drop of voter participation in the one-time nonpartisan election of 1910 and the general
decline of voter participation in nonpartisan elections after 1932 suggest that party labels
were important for many voters.” ELLIS WALDRON & PAUL B. WILSON, ATLAS OF
MONTANA ELECTIONS: 1889–1976 at 289 (1978).
45. State ex rel. Holliday v. O’Leary, 115 P. 204 (1911).
46. See MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra note 8, at 303.
47. WALDRON, supra note 44, at 229, 251, 261 (explaining that all three justices were
elected as Republicans in 1928, that two associate justices were elected as Democrats in
1932, and that the chief justice and an associate justice were elected as Democrats in 1934).
In an example of the effect of partisanship during this period, Associate Justice Albert H.
Angstman, an incumbent elected as a Republican in 1928, lost to Democrat C. F. Morris in
1934, and then won over incumbent John A. Matthews (who was elected and reelected as a
Democrat in 1924 and 1930) in the 1936 nonpartisan election. See id. at 208, 237, 261, 272
(discussing the elections of 1924, 1930, 1934, and 1936).
48. 1935 MONT. LAWS 389, ch. 182 (Mont. 24th Leg. Assembly, 1935). The Legislature had by then expanded the Supreme Court from three to five seats. See 1919 MONT.
LAWS 86, ch. 31.
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of sales of political and even judicial influence were lightly
looked upon.”49 A mining trade publication observed at the time
that “[t]he judiciary of a State has been debauched, its politics
mired, its people obsessed, while two parties of mine owners
have twisted our awkward mining laws to the acquirement of
territory and the destruction of property.”50 Going forward,
Amalgamated’s successor the Anaconda Company “dominated
Montana after 1906 like no other single company dominated any
other state, with the possible exception of the tiny Dupont
satrapy of Delaware.”51 This corporate domination lasted
decades, until a mix of political and social changes in the 1960s
brought calls for reform, and eventually a new state constitution.
C. A New State Constitution
Reapportionment of the state legislature in 1965, ordered in
the wake of the one-person one-vote revolution,52 accelerated
the declining political influence of the Anaconda Company and
its antagonists in the mining unions.53 In 1967 the new
legislature commissioned a report “to determine if [the 1889
Constitution] is adequately serving the current needs of the
people.”54 The resulting Legislative Council Report concluded
in 1968 that just forty-eight percent of the sections in the 1889
Constitution were adequate in that they did not “present a major
obstacle to effective government.”55 The Montana Supreme
Court itself may have hastened constitutional reform. In a series
of decisions leading up to ratification of the 1972 Constitution,
the court voided several attempts to revise some of the more

49. DONALD MACMILLAN, SMOKE WARS: ANACONDA, COPPER, MONTANA AIR
POLLUTION, AND THE COURTS, 1890–1920 at 173 (2000).
50. Id. (quoting The Amalgamated and Mr. Heinze, Mining and Scientific Press 92
(Feb. 17, 1909)).
51. MALONE, supra note 21, at 210.
52. See Herweg v. Thirty-Ninth Leg. Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (1965).
53. See MALONE, ROEDER & LANG, supra n. 8, at 393–94.
54. Mont. H. Rep. No. 17 (1967); Mont. S. Rep. No. 22 (1967).
55. Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report No. 6: Legislative
Council Report on the Montana Constitution 1 (1971) [hereinafter Legislative Council
Report].
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inflexible provisions of the 1889 Constitution.56 Professor Ellis
Waldron concluded at this time that the Montana Supreme Court
had been “notably ‘activist’ in its willingness to become
involved in the processes of constitutional revision, and notably
‘conservative’ in its view of the power of the people and their
constituted representatives to change basic constitutional
rules.”57
1. A Call for a New Constitution
The judiciary, including judicial selection, emerged as a
central concern of constitutional reformers. In a 1967 “Blueprint
for Modernization,” Professors David Mason and William
Crowley proposed a comprehensive revision of the state’s
judicial system, criticizing the 1889 judicial article as “designed
for a horse and buggy society . . . cumbersome, inefficient and
expensive.”58 The Blueprint’s primary focus was judicial
administration and organization, particularly of the inferior
courts. Yet it included an option to enact alternatives to judicial
elections, “[i]f the legislature should see fit at some time in the
future to adopt the Missouri Plan [of merit selection] or some
variant thereof.”59 The Legislative Council stopped short of
criticizing judicial elections, but noted that the method of
judicial selection presented “a basic question,” and that the
Missouri Plan had been recommended by the American
Judicature Society, the American Bar Association, and the
National Municipal League.60
The Council also indicated that the practice of judicial
elections in Montana resembled the policy of the Missouri Plan:
“many judges are appointed initially and subsequent elections
are essentially on the question of whether the judge should be
retained,” and “appointments to fill vacancies are not usually

56. Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 MONT. L. REV.
325, 335–36 (2010).
57. Ellis Waldron, The Role of the Montana Supreme Court in Constitutional Revision,
35 MONT. L. REV. 227, 229 (1974).
58. David R. Mason & William F. Crowley, Montana’s Judicial System—A Blueprint
for Modernization, 29 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1967).
59. Id. at 11.
60. Legislative Council Report, supra note 55, at 39.
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made without consultation with informed persons.”61 This was,
however, consistently true only for district court judges, and was
less often the case for supreme court justices. Indeed, from the
adoption of the 1889 Constitution to its replacement in 1972,
sixty-four of sixty-eight elections for supreme court justice were
contested.62 These elections often were competitive. The
average vote total for winning a supreme court justice was fiftytwo percent during the period of partisan judicial elections, and
sixty-two percent during the period of nonpartisan judicial
elections.63 Twenty incumbent justices lost reelection bids.64
Before 1972, one-third of supreme court justices were initially
appointed, but only one-third of those appointees went on to be
elected for a full term.65 Judicial elections played a more
significant role in the composition of the supreme court than the
Council suggested.
In a 1970 referendum, Montana voters called a
Constitutional Convention.66 As the Convention approached, the
Legislative Council’s 1968 report was supplemented by a 1969
Constitution Revision Commission report, and by in-depth staff
reports prepared by a legislatively authorized Constitutional
Convention Commission.67 A subcommittee of the Revision
Commission noted five failed attempts from 1945 to 1967 to
ballot constitutional amendments adopting the Missouri Plan in
Montana.68 The subcommittee, in consultation with a Judicial
Reform Committee appointed by the Montana Bar Association,
also largely endorsed the Mason-Crowley Blueprint, adding that

61. Id.
62. WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 289–304.
63. JAMES J. LOPACH, ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA: WORKINGS OF A
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 159 (1983) (counting judicial elections from 1889 to 1977).
64. Id. at 158 (counting judicial elections from 1889 to 1977).
65. Id. at 290–92; see also id. at 157 (noting that “[o]nly seven of fifteen appointed
justices seeking an elective term were successful between 1889 and 1977”).
66. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 9 (2001).
67. Id. at 8–9 (also indicating that the Commission included representatives appointed
by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches).
68. Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report No. 7: Constitutional
Provisions Proposed by Constitution Revision Subcommittees 11 (1972).
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“the constitution should permit the legislature to adopt a merit
system of selection, and not require election of judges.”69
When the Constitutional Convention delegates met in early
1972, they had the benefit of a detailed report on the Montana
courts and state judiciaries in general.70 The report explained
that judicial elections arose from a combination of concerns
about checking judicial review, the common-law authority of
judges to make interstitial law, and populist critiques of lawyers
as a class.71 It noted the sweep of judicial elections across most
states in latter half of the nineteenth century, many states’ switch
to nonpartisan elections in reaction to machine politics in the
early twentieth century, and the advent of merit selection under
the Missouri Plan in the latter half of the twentieth century.72
Like the earlier Council Report, the Convention Commission
Report misleadingly repeated that in practice, “the original
selection of most of Montana’s appellate and trial court judges is
not by the people but by the governor.”73 By 1972, four of the
five supreme court justices had been appointed before being
elected, though this was an anomaly; at the time those four
justices represented more than half of the seven appointees
elected since statehood.74
The report explained that “[t]he major criticism of the
elective system of judicial selection, be it partisan or nonpartisan, is that voter knowledge of candidates and their
qualifications is insufficient to form a basis for a rational
choice.”75 In Montana, where non-partisan elections lack the
intermediation of party nomination, “candidates who would
never be nominated by a party could be elected to political
office by such irrelevant factors as a large campaign fund, a
69. Id. at 16.
70. Sandra R. Muckelston & Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, Report
No. 14: The Judiciary (1972) (including appendices of model judicial articles from the
American Bar Association, National Municipal League, and other reform groups, and a
description of the Missouri Plan).
71. Id. at 133.
72. Id. at 134–35 (also explaining that at the time of the Convention, seventeen states
selected judges by partisan elections, fourteen states by nonpartisan elections, fourteen
states by appointment, and nine states by merit selection).
73. Id. at 136.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. Muckelston, et al., supra note 70, at 138.
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pleasing television image, or a preferential place on the
ballot.”76 Non-partisan elections, the report found, also may
aggravate the campaign finance problems associated with
electing judges. Without a party’s financial base, a judicial
candidate must “use his own resources or depend upon
contributions from ‘friends,’ which may affect his impartiality
just as much as those judges who receive financial support from
party coffers.”77 One Montana justice estimated that he spent
nine months of an election year campaigning for office.78 Yet
without party labels, much of the campaigning may have been
futile due to ballot roll-off in relatively low-information judicial
races. “Prior to the adoption of the non-partisan ballot the Chief
Justice race in various years polled 91 to 94 percent of the votes
cast for the governor; this decreased to 77 [percent] seventeen
years after initiation of the plan.”79
These concerns led to legislative consideration of a merit
plan for judicial selection in Montana at least five times between
1945 and 1969.80 One of the more heavily debated bills was
proposed in 1957, after “the Montana Supreme Court had
amassed a three-year backlog of cases caused, in part, by
justices’ campaigning for re-election in 1956,” and “some
representatives felt a solution to the court’s backlog was
elimination of the election of judges.”81 The nominating
commission contemplated by the 1957 proposal consisted of five
district judges from different regions of the state, the president
of the Montana Bar Association, and three gubernatorial
appointees confirmed by the senate: a farmer or rancher, a labor
union member, and a businessman.82 The bill was defeated in
the House by forty-six votes to forty-four, with broad support
from Republicans but opposition from most Democrats, who
were then in the majority.83 Opponents complained that the bill
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing 1971 interview with Justice Frank Haswell).
79. Id. (citing MONTANA BAR ASSOCIATION, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
(1956)).
80. Id. at 148.
81. Id. at 149.
82. Id. at 148–49 (citing H.B. 48 35th Leg. Sess. § 6 (Mont. 1957)).
83. Id.; see also House J. 35th Leg. Sess. 399 (Mont. 1957).
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was “undemocratic,” and “deprived the people of the right to
decide for themselves what members of the legal profession
should sit as judges.”84 The convention report viewed the merit
plans favorably, but rebutted the opponents’ arguments by
repeating the misleading claim that
[b]ecause most district judges and supreme court justices
were initially appointed by the governor to an interim
vacancy and subsequently as an incumbent elected by the
people for another term when the appointive term expired,
two elements of the merit plan were already in existence:
gubernatorial appointment and retention election.85

Thus, according to the report, a merit plan would be more
democratic, since “[t]hrough citizen representation on the
nominating commission the electorate in effect would have had
a voice in the initial choice of a judge—an element non-existent
under Montana’s present system.”86 Again, however, this
overstated the role of appointments in judicial selection,
particularly with respect to the Montana Supreme Court of 1957:
While approximately half of district judges (who outnumbered
supreme court justices) were appointed at that time, nearly twothirds of then-sitting supreme court justices had been elected
initially.87
2. The Constitutional Convention of 1972
The 1972 report and the earlier studies set the stage for an
unusually deliberative discussion of judicial selection by the one
hundred elected delegates of the Constitutional Convention.
Twenty-four of the delegates were lawyers, and those lawyerdelegates carried on most of the debate on the judicial article
among themselves.88 The delegates’ consideration of the judicial
article was among the longest and most divided at the

84. Muckelston, et al., supra note 70, at 149.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 289.
88. Fritz Snyder & Mae Nan Ellingson, The Lawyer-Delegates of the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention: Their Influence and Importance, 72 MONT. L. REV. 53, 86
(2011) (noting that “[v]ery few delegates other than lawyers participated in the debate on
the Judicial Article”).
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Convention, consuming nearly two full days of debate.89 The
Judiciary Committee divided five-to-four, issuing a majority and
a minority report, and “split most sharply on the issue of how
judges should be selected.”90
The convention’s proceedings were notable for a general
atmosphere of bipartisanship.91 Yet the Judiciary Committee’s
votes substantially divided along party lines, even to the extent
that party “trumped the divide between lawyers and non-lawyers
on the Committee.”92 Democrats controlled the Committee six
members to three, though in their work they broke into a
working majority of five Democrats supporting the majority
proposal, and three Republicans and a Democrat supporting a
minority proposal.93
The majority report retained much of the 1889
Constitution’s provisions, including judicial elections.94 The
minority report proposed a modified merit plan, in which “the
governor of the state shall nominate a supreme court or district
court judge from nominees selected in the manner provided by
law,” with one opportunity for a contested election after
appointment, followed by retention elections for each
succeeding term of office.95 In extensive commentary, the
minority observed “that today, few, if any, of the voters are at all
acquainted with the judicial candidates,” and “the present
system of elected judiciary utterly and completely fails to attain”

89. IV MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1010–
1180 (1979) [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT].
90. Jean M. Bowman, The Judicial Article: What Went Wrong? 51 MONT. L. REV. 492,
497 (1990); see also Judiciary Committee Report in I MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS 485 (1972) (indicating that “the members of the committee
had philosophical differences, particularly about selection of judges”) [hereinafter
CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS].
91. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 66, at 11 (“The voters elected delegates on a
partisan basis, but the sentiment in the convention was to organize it in a bipartisan fashion.
Thus seating was alphabetical rather than by party. The president of the convention
appointed both Democrats and Republicans to chair committees, and he appointed a
delegate from the opposite party to be a co-chairperson of each committee.”)
92. Morriss, supra note 10, at 30.
93. The Democrat in the minority, J. Mason Melvin of Gallatin County, who had a lawenforcement background, “may have been a relatively conservative Democrat.” Id. at 30
n.19.
94. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 495 (Majority Proposal § 6).
95. Id. at 511–12 (Minority Proposal § 7).
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the informed electorate necessary for “the survival of democratic
institutions.”96 At the same time, the minority was “especially
apprehensive of the future political character of [Montana’s]
judges,” citing “statistics revealing that an overwhelming
majority” of the judges (but not supreme court justices) had
“been appointed by the governor.”97 This modified Missouri
Plan of commission nomination, executive appointment, and
voter retention reflected elements of the so-called Montana
Plan,98 but added the intervening opportunity for a contested
election after appointment.99
Despite the legal establishment’s support for a merit plan
more like the minority’s hybrid proposal, the Judiciary
Committee’s poll of nearly 500 lawyers in the state found that a
slight majority favored judicial elections; over a hundred
members of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association favored
elections by more than a two-to-one margin.100 Delegate John
M. Schiltz, a former legislator and an unsuccessful candidate for
chief justice in 1970,101 made a case for judicial elections based
on personal and political history. In Montana, he explained, “we
have strong corporate influence; where, if I can elect a
Governor, and through that office nominate and appoint the
district and the Supreme Court judges, I can run this state. . . . I
can own it.”102 Noting how the Anaconda Company and its
former affiliate the Montana Power Company could dominate

96. Id. at 520.
97. Id. at 521.
98. See generally Mason & Crowley, supra note 58.
99. The Committee witness list named proponents of the Montana Plan including
Professors Mason and Crowley of the Montana School of Law; the Dean of the Montana
School of Law, Robert E. Sullivan; the Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, J. T.
Harrison; the President of the Montana Bar Association, William Bellingham;
representatives of the American Judicature Society and Montana Citizens for Court
Improvement, several state district judges (Paul Hatfield, W. W. Lessley, and Robert
Wilson); and federal district judge Russell Smith. See CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS at 533–
36 (Appendix C). Interestingly, Francis Mitchell, a representative of the political reform
group Montana Common Cause, opposed the Montana Plan and favored partisan election
of Supreme Court justices. Id. at 534.
100. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1014 (statement of Del. Holland).
101. See CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 58 (summarizing Schiltz
biography); WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at 290 (discussing Schiltz as a candidate
for chief justice).
102. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1026 (statement of Del. Schiltz).
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appointment processes, including the Constitutional Convention
Commission itself, he concluded that
you cannot pick a committee in the State of Montana that
will be totally free of that kind of influence. And I am
afraid of it, and if I have to choose between one or the
other, I’m going to the electorate every time, because I had
a chance . . . to be elected. With another few bucks, I might
have made it.103

Delegate James C. Garlington, also a lawyer, argued for
judicial appointment. “There is clear agreement on the part of all
that we do need good judges,” he noted, “[t]he question is how
to recruit them.”104 He expressed “utmost sympathy” for judicial
candidates who “must undergo the type of ordeal that Mr.
Schiltz very feelingly described.”105 He suggested that such an
ordeal makes judicial office unattractive for most lawyers “who
have any kind of a stable, private practice” because the judicial
candidate “must sever himself completely from the private
practice of law,” and should he return to practice after losing a
campaign, “he then begins at absolute rock bottom . . . no
clients, no office, no library, no nothing.”106
Because the minority proposal represented a greater change
from the current judicial article, and perhaps because delegates
were initially more receptive to its reforms, the Convention
voted to debate it instead of the minor changes contained in the
majority proposal.107 Over the lengthy debate, however,
amendments transformed key provisions of the minority report
into something resembling the majority report’s election plan.108
In a series of sharply divided votes the delegates eventually
rejected both the majority and minority proposals and adopted
Article VII, section 8, whose original text suggests its

103. Id. at 1027 (statement of Del. Schiltz).
104. Id. at 1032 (statement of Del. Garlington).
105. Id. (statement of Del. Garlington).
106. Id. (statement of Del. Garlington).
107. Id. at 1034–35; see also Snyder & Ellingson, supra note 88, at 86 (asserting that
“[w]ith that vote, it became clear that a majority of the delegates favored judicial reform”).
108. Bowman, supra note 90, at 495 (reporting that “much of the majority report
actually was adopted” and noting “the lack of major substantive change from the 1889
Constitution” in the judicial article of the new constitution).
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complicated origins.109 In a concession to merit selection, its
first section provides “replacement . . . for any vacancy” by the
governor’s appointment “from nominees selected in the manner
provided by law,” subject to senate confirmation.110 Its second
section provides for retention elections as the default, but
permits contested elections.111 Its third section provides for an
election “[i]f an incumbent does not run.”112 The result, in other
words, was the maintenance of contested judicial elections, but
with a merit plan of appointment by nominees from a selection
committee in case of vacancies. Based on a campaign that noted,
revealingly “[c]ontested election of judges is not changed,”113
the people narrowly ratified the 1972 Constitution, including the
new judicial article.
3. Public Financing for Judicial Elections
A collateral consequence of the debate at the Constitutional
Convention was a failed proposal for public financing of judicial
campaigns. The Judiciary Committee proposed a section
requiring the legislature to “appropriate funds for the contested
general election campaign expenses of candidates for the offices
of justices of the supreme court and district court judges.”114
Unlike the primary selection proposal, the public-financing
proposal enjoyed broad support on the committee.115 Public
109. Snyder & Ellingson, supra note 88, at 88–90 (referring to principles involved,
summarizing work of ad hoc committee, and describing portions of floor debate).
110. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1) (1973).
111. Id. art. VII, § 8(2).
112. Id. art. VII, § 8(3).
113. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR
THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANATION 13 (1972).
114. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 508 (setting out Separate Majority
Proposal on Campaign Expenses). The proposal also prohibited expenditures “in excess of
the amount appropriated,” an expenditure limit that would even then have been found
unconstitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (holding that campaign
expenditure limits “place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates,
citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the
First Amendment cannot tolerate”).
115. The reprinted report includes the names of all nine committee members under the
proposal, but denotes the names of Delegates Pemberton, Bowman, and Berg as “(original
unsigned).” CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 508 (setting out Separate
Majority Proposal on Campaign Expenses). These were the three Republican delegates on
the Committee; the others were Democrats. See id. at 31–64 (listing delegate biographies).
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financing of judicial elections was not raised in any of the preconvention studies, and appeared to originate with the Judiciary
Committee itself. Because the majority and minority proposals
both contemplated contested non-partisan judicial elections, the
entire committee recognized “the same problems we have
always had” with judges running for office.116 These included
(1) the necessity that the judge demean himself and his
position by seeking campaign funds;
(2) the fact that the wrong people can make contributions;
(3) the fact that lawyers are the biggest contributors and
solicitors of campaign funds to the detriment of themselves
than the candidate;
(4) the fact that the candidate with the most money to spend
is the more likely to win regardless of merit; and
(5) the fact that the appearance of justice suffers in the
117
process.

The committee’s solution to these problems prompted a
prescient discussion of campaign finance in judicial elections.
Delegate Schiltz opened the debate on the public-financing
provision, noting that the cost to taxpayers of financing judicial
elections was a “pittance in view of the benefits,” including an
“independent Judiciary” and assurance “that one man was not
buying the job.”118 More broadly, he turned to the national
presidential election then underway, noting that Edmund
Muskie’s presidential campaign was “going to cost him or
somebody $40 million.”119 Looking toward a future of bigmoney campaigns, he warned that “this is going to come to
Montana, and I can think of no other, better place to start as an
experiment for a very small amount of money than on the
Judiciary.”120 But Delegate Jean Bowman, who favored the
appointment-and-retention-election plan of the minority
Unlike votes on the primary majority and minority proposals, votes on the public-financing
proposal appear to have broken along party lines.
116. Id. at 509 (including comments on Separate Majority Proposal on Campaign
Expenses).
117. Id.
118. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra n. 89, at 1137 (statement of Del. Schiltz).
119. Id. (statement of Del. Schiltz).
120. Id. (statement of Del. Schiltz).
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proposal, suggested that if judicial candidates had to run in
contested elections, they should look to the political parties for
financial support.121 “As a taxpayer,” the Republican Bowman
argued in response to the Democrat Schiltz, “I really do not wish
to have part of my taxes go to someone’s campaign
expenses.”122
The delegates gave the public-financing proposal
preliminary approval by a narrow margin, but voted later that
day to reconsider the proposal, and opened a deeper debate on
the issue.123 Delegate William Burkhardt reported that a lawyer
friend wrote to him, stating that he hoped it would be “well
debated before its death.”124 So it was. Several lawyers spoke in
support. Delegate Wade Dahood argued that
only the so-called “big boys” can afford to support
[candidates] with enough campaign funds so that they can
be successful; and as a consequence, being the imperfect
beings that they are, just like the rest of us, subconsciously,
at least, it has an effect upon their decision and upon their
work in our behalf as part of the highest tribunal of this
125
state.

Delegate and Convention President Leo Graybill asked whether
the delegates were “going to let the Judiciary continue to get its
money to run for contested Supreme Court offices by getting it
from big . . . corporations and concerns who have a lot of
litigation in the Supreme Court.”126 To the criticism that public
financing would simply relieve lawyers from funding judicial
campaigns, Delegate Graybill continued by asserting that “[t]he
people that it’s going to relieve is the common people who have
to go to that Supreme Court occasionally against some major
interest who is there constantly.”127
Opponents, however, doubted that the legislature would
provide sufficient funding, and asked why only the judiciary
should have public campaign financing entrenched in the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. (statement of Del. Bowman).
Id. (statement of Del. Bowman).
Id. at 1164–65.
Id. at 1165 (statement of Del. Burkhardt).
Id. at 1166 (statement of Del. Dahood).
Id. at 1167 (statement of Del. Graybill).
Id. (statement of Del. Graybill).
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constitution. “If we can’t do it for . . . the Governor and all the
rest of the candidates,” announced Delegate Grace Bates, “why,
I don’t feel we should do it just for Supreme Court.”128 Delegate
Joe Eskildsen, originally a proponent of the proposal on the
Judiciary Committee, argued that
when you look for political office, then you got to expect to
find your own campaign funds and to finance it yourself. . . .
I don’t think we should do anything for the Judiciary that
we don’t do for the Legislature and, especially, that we
129
don’t do for the Governor.

Delegate Garlington, a lawyer, raised free speech concerns,
worried that the measure would “inhibit the rights of citizen
groups to take an interest in” judicial elections.130 Delegate
William Swanberg, another lawyer, raised concerns about
circumvention: “[T]he state will be on the [hook] for the basic
campaign expenses, and some candidate will find some way of
getting around it.”131 By the end of the day’s debate, several
delegates moved to adjourn and take “a chance to think about
this overnight,” but those motions were defeated.132 Then the
delegates voted to delete the provision.133
Two weeks later, with the judiciary article reported out of
the Style and Drafting Committee, Delegate Rick Champoux
recalled an earlier point made by Delegate Schiltz: “[I]f we
don’t provide the expenses for these judges, somebody else will,
and that other group will be, in the main, large companies that
come before this court, whether they do it directly or
indirectly.”134 In response, the delegates suspended the rules to
reconsider the proposal, but only as applied to supreme court
128. Id. at 1169 (statement of Del. Bates). Schiltz later responded to Bates by indicating
that he hoped Montana would “someday” finance the campaigns of candidates in political
campaigns as well as those in judicial races, but pointing out that “in the meantime
[candidates for political offices] have the advantage of running on a partisan ticket.” Id. at
1177 (statement of Del. Schiltz).
129. Id. (statement of Del. Eskildsen).
130. Id. at 1173 (statement of Del. Garlington).
131. Id. at 1177 (statement of Del. Swanberg).
132. See, e.g., id. at 1168 (motion of Del. Babcock); see also id. at 1170–71 (motion of
Del. Babcock asking for proposal to be printed and distributed overnight so that the
delegates could study it in the morning).
133. Id. at 1178–79, 1181.
134. Id. at 2189 (statement of Del. Champoux).
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justices.135 Judges “are supposed to decide fairly and evenly
between all of us after they get elected,” Delegate Graybill
reminded the delegates during the debate that followed, pointing
out that “[i]t’s one thing to support a senator or a congressman
and have him help you out with a bureaucracy; it’s another thing
to support a judge and have him help you out with a
decision.”136
Delegate Garlington, however, had already advised against
an unprecedented constitutional provision for public financing:
“[I]t seems to me the proper judgment here is to leave this to
such time as it may genuinely prove in our own state to be an
evil that needs correction, and then our people’s representatives,
the Legislature, can do so.”137 And Delegate Dave Drum
observed that public financing might upset the longstanding
tradition of the lawyers-money primary, whereby “you may
wind up with the gentleman as a Supreme Court justice who the
legal fraternity generally thinks will be the best judge.”138 Others
raised fiscal concerns that voters might reject a new constitution
with spending mandates that seemed to have been included “in
order to finance all the political aspirations of our lawyers
wanting to run for Supreme Court justice or other higher
offices.”139 Delegate Dahood responded by arguing that “[t]he
taxpayer, above all, should have paramount interest in this
proposal” because “[h]e is the one that is affected by the quality
of justice, more than anyone else.”140 This time, the delegates
adopted the proposal by fifty-five votes to thirty-two.141

135. Id. at 2190–91.
136. Id. at 2198 (statement of Del. Graybill).
137. Id. at 2196 (statement of Del. Garlington).
138. Id. at 2201 (statement of Del. Drum).
139. Id. at 2199 (statement of Del. Erdmann); see also id. at 2200–01 (statement of Del.
Kamhoot expressing concern about taxpayer reaction to funding mandates when voting on
whether to approve the new constitution).
140. Id. at 2201 (statement of Del. Dahood).
141. Id. at 2204–05. Yet the debate was not quite over. Delegates adopted the Style and
Drafting Committee report on the reconsidered proposal by voice vote, but not before
Delegate John Toole, a former Republican legislator, said that he had “talked to a number
of Legislators about this in the last few days,” and “[t]hey seem[ed] to be of the unanimous
opinion they will appropriate $1” for judicial campaign expenses. Id. at 2432 (Statement of
Del. Toole).
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All that remained was final consideration of the judicial
article. The Convention adopted the first thirteen sections—
including the compromise judicial-selection section—by wide
margins.142 But when the Convention reached the final section
of the judicial article, on campaign expenses, the ayes fell three
votes short of a majority.143 The Convention sent the Sergeant to
find absent delegates, and voted upon their return to reconsider.
But in a final vote, with all but three of the delegates present, the
public-financing proposal fell short again.144 After an agonizing
series of debates, what would have been a major innovation in
state judicial elections failed by just two votes.
4. Implementation and Modifications
The implementation of the new constitution’s hybrid merit
plan for appointees though a judicial nomination commission
fell short of the reformers’ aspirations even for a compromise.
According to the new judicial article, “the governor shall
appoint a replacement [for a vacant judicial office] from
nominees selected in the manner provided by law.”145 The
minority report, “not satisfied with the current process of
unlimited gubernatorial appointive power of judges,” had
expressed a preference that “the committee should be elected by
the legislature for staggered terms” and “bi-partisan in
character.”146 The minority report, however, had “purposely
refrained from attempting to provide for the organization of the
nominating committee in the belief that the legislature is better
able to vigilantly oversee its operation.”147 In 1973, a
Democratic majority in the legislature enacted—and a
Democratic governor signed—a bill creating a seven-member
142. Id. at 2434–49. The votes became so routine, in fact, that the President of the
Convention, Delegate Graybill, noticed that several delegates were forgetting to vote: “I
don’t want to disturb you people—(Laughter)—but if you want to vote, now is the time.”
Id. at 2441 (Statement of Del. Graybill).
143. Id. at 2450.
144. Id. at 2453 (showing the final vote tally on the public-funding section of the judicial
article as forty-nine to forty-eight).
145. Mont. Const. Art. VII, § 8(2).
146. CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90, at 520–21 (Minority Proposal § 7
comments).
147. Id. at 521.
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judicial nomination commission controlled by a majority of four
members appointed by the governor, not the legislature.148
Proponents of broader reforms hardly welcomed the
compromise judicial article. Delegate Mason Melvin, a
Democrat who signed onto the reform-minded minority report
with the three Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, later
noted with regret that “the Legislature tossed the mechanics of
the appointment of judges right into the political kettle” by
giving the governor the power to appoint the majority of the
nominating commission.149 But he also pointed out that “when
Montanans decide to take another step in insulating the Judiciary
from the other branches—and politics—corrections will be
made.”150 Delegate Jean Bowman, also in the minority on the
Judiciary Committee, agreed, writing years later that the 1972
Constitution “bungles the method of selection process,” because
it “provides for neither pure election nor merit selection and, at
best, constitutionalizes uncertainty in the constitution in the
method of selection.”151 The judge for whom Delegate Bowman
later clerked, Justice John C. Harrison, reached a harsher
judgment: the “worst judiciary article in fifty states.”152
The legislature and voters appear to agree that the
Convention left room for improvement. The judicial article is
among the most frequently amended articles in the Montana
Constitution, with voters approving all four constitutional
referenda amending the article.153 Sometimes popular backlash
prompted these judicial reforms.

148. MONT. LAWS 1177, ch. 470, § 1 (1973). The commission consists of “four lay
members who are neither judges nor attorneys” appointed by the governor from different
regions and vocations, two attorneys appointed by the supreme court from different
regions, and one district judge elected by the district judges. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-11001. The members serve staggered four-year terms. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1002.
149. Mason Melvin, Judiciary Committee, in 100 DELEGATES: MONTANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1972 at 31 (1989).
150. Id.
151. Bowman, supra note 90, at 498.
152. LOPACH ET AL., supra n. 63, at 150 (quoting 1980 Interview with Justice John C.
Harrison).
153. Johnstone, supra note 56, at 355. One of those amendments comprehensively
revised the selection provision in 1992, twenty years after its adoption. See H.B. 353
(Mont. 52nd Leg. Sess. 1992) (proposing language that became amendment 22 to the
Montana Constitution).
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In the 1980s, the Montana Supreme Court confronted the
legislature repeatedly in cases involving the constitutionality of
tort immunity and welfare reform.154 By the end of the decade,
vote changes on the court and constitutional amendments by the
people resolved much of the controversy.155 Yet concern about
the court’s potential overreach lingered.156
Calls to broaden the scope of judicial elections, and narrow
remaining opportunities for judicial appointments, intensified in
response to a 1990 case upholding three judicial appointments,
including a supreme court appointment, made without
submitting the appointees to an election on the next possible
ballot. The Montana Supreme Court interpreted Article VII,
section 8, to postpone the election of an appointed justice or
judge until after the senate had the opportunity to confirm or
reject the appointee.157 The court emphasized that section eight
provided “a selection system which gives recognition to both
appointment and election,” reiterating the incomplete history
that “most of the justices and judges” (in fact, most of the judges
but few of the justices) were appointed initially.158 Further, the
court noted that “[t]he current makeup of the judiciary reflects
the delegates’ recognition of both appointment and election,” as
“[e]ighteen of the thirty-six currently serving District Court
Judges and three of the seven currently serving Supreme Court
Justices began their offices as appointees.”159
In 1992, critics of the decision upholding these judicial
appointments proposed a constitutional amendment requiring
appointees to stand for election regardless of whether the senate
had yet had an opportunity to confirm them during one of its
biennial sessions. Proponents of the amendment argued that too
many “holdover” appointees held office for years pending

154. See James J. Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Politics, 48 MONT. L. REV.
267 (1987) (criticizing the court); see also Bari R. Burke, Constitutional Initiative 30:
What Constitutional Rights Did Montanans Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability
Insurance? 48 MONT. L. REV. 53 (1987) (criticizing the legislature).
155. See Johnstone, supra note 56, at 357–59.
156. See Lopach, supra note 154, at 296 (“The court’s insistence that it must have the
last word in state policymaking has severely damaged democratic politics.”).
157. State ex rel. Racicot v. Dist. Court, 794 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 1990).
158. Id. at 1185.
159. Id.
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confirmation without standing for election. The amendment
eliminated “the potential for the improper use of the
appointment process,” according to the proponents, under a
constitution that provides “for the electoral selection of
judges.”160 Montanans ratified the amendment by a three-to-one
margin.161 The election results suggested that voters viewed
these holdover appointments as a bug, not a feature, of the
constitution’s judicial-selection process.
The constitutional journey of judicial reform began with the
Montana Plan for merit selection. At the Constitutional
Convention, it moved through the minority report’s emphasis on
commission nominations with retention elections. With
ratification of the original section 8, it led to an uneasy
compromise of appointments and contested elections during the
state constitution’s first two decades. The journey ended (for
now, at least) with the 1992 amendment, an emphatic doubling
down, by constitutional referendum, on judicial elections.162

160. Montana Secretary of State, 1992 Voter Information 5 (1992).
161. Montana Secretary of State 1972–Present Historical Constitutional Initiatives and
Constitutional Amendments, 7 (Feb. 26, 2013), http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/forms/history/
constitutionalmeasureslist2012.pdf (accessed Sept. 8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process). The amendment clarified that “Supreme court justices and
district court judges shall be elected by the qualified electors as provided by law,” and that
“[n]o appointee, whether confirmed or unconfirmed, shall serve past the term of his
predecessor without standing for election.” Mont. Const. Art. VII, § 8.
162. In 2006 voters petitioned for a constitutional amendment providing for recall of
judges and justices for “any reason acknowledging electoral dissatisfaction with a justice or
judge,” a broader standard than that required by prior law. See Montana Secretary of State,
2006 Voter Information 20 (2006) (addressing Constitutional Initiative No. 98). Proponents
in the legislature argued that it would “be a powerful tool for judicial accountability and
democratic oversight of a branch of government that for too long has been too removed
from the will of the people.” Id. at 22 (statements of Rep. Edward B. Butcher, Rep. Diane
Rice, and Rep. Michael Lange). It would, they argued, “allow us to challenge judges who
throw violent criminals and pedophiles out on the street, ‘legislate’ radical political
agendas or destroy our constitutional freedoms.” Id. at 24. Three retired justices wrote in
opposition to the amendment because “[t]he rights and protection of our citizens are
dependent upon a fair, impartial and unbiased judiciary,” and “[i]f the judges were
confronted with the threat of constant and repeated recall elections, they would be
distracted from the performance of their duties and subjected to great expense in defending
recall elections.” Id. 23 (statements of former Justice John C. Harrison, former Chief
Justice Jean Turnage, and former Justice John C. Sheehy). The amendment was decertified
and struck from the ballot for fraud in the petition process. See Montanans for Just. v. State
ex. rel. McGrath, 146 P.3d 759 (Mont. 2006).
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III. A MODERN PRACTICE OF STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. Appointments, Retention, and Elections
Despite arguments during the Constitutional Convention
about whether appointed or elected justices were the norm in
Montana, and the renewed debate during the 1992 amendment
campaign, appointments of justices increased slightly since 1972
without notable comment. Eleven of the 27 justices seated under
the new constitution—or forty-one percent—were appointed
initially, up from one-third under the old constitution.163 Of the
eleven appointees, six were reelected.164 Earlier commentators
described “justices who resigned before completion of a term so
that a politically allied governor could appoint a replacement,”
and others who “endured under personally adverse conditions to
prevent a replacement being appointed by an unfriendly
governor.”165 Yet there is no evidence since 1972 that justices
timed retirements to coincide with a governor of the same party
as the governor who appointed them.166
Every incumbent justice who sought reelection won except
for Charles Erdman, a recent appointee who lost to the slightly
better financed private practitioner James Regnier in 1996.167 In
contests for open seats, the candidate who raised the most
163. Anthony Johnstone, Montana Supreme Court Justices Dataset (on file with Author)
[hereinafter Justices Dataset]. The source data from 1912 to 2014 is available from the
state of Montana. Montana Secretary of State, Montana Statewide General Election
Canvass, 1912–2014, http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/archives/index.asp (accessed Nov. 10,
2015; copy of main page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The
source data from 1889 to 1910 is available in WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 44, at
289–92. Included in the eleven appointees is Justice Frank Haswell, who was appointed to
Chief Justice from Associate Justice in 1977.
164. Id.
165. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 63, at 157.
166. Four appointees retired before the ends of their terms. Two appointees of
Democrats retired under Republican governors: John C. Sheehy (appointed by Governor
Thomas Judge in 1978 and resigned under Governor Stan Stephens in 1991) and R.C.
McDonough (appointed by Governor Ted Schwinden in 1987 and resigned under Governor
Marc Racicot in 1993). One appointee of a Republican retired during the appointing
governor’s term: Diane Barz (appointed by Governor Stan Stephens in 1989 and resigned
in 1991 when Stephens was still in office). The other appointee of a Republican, John
Warner, retired under a Democratic governor (appointed by Governor Judy Martz in 2003
and resigned under Governor Brian Schweitzer in 2009). Justices Dataset, supra note 163.
167. Id.

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MONTANA

77

money won except for Judge Edward McLean in 2004, who lost
to State Solicitor Brian Morris despite raising more money, and
private practitioner Beth Baker, who beat District Judge Nels
Swandal in a relatively low-dollar campaign.168 Of twenty-seven
elections for supreme court justice since 1990, including postappointment elections for the remainder of an appointee’s first
term, twelve were uncontested.169
B. Increasing Partisanship
Partisanship only recently emerged as a major issue in
Montana Supreme Court campaigns. That is not to say that
voters respected a barrier between judicial and legislative or
executive offices, even after non-partisan elections began in
1935. Montanans occasionally elected partisan politicians to the
supreme court, and elected justices to partisan political office.
Six state attorneys general moved from in front of the bench to
behind it, including current Chief Justice Mike McGrath.170 Two
governors became justices, and two justices became governors,
including former associate justice Forrest H. Anderson, who
governed during the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention.171 A half-dozen justices came to the bench with
experience as state legislators, including two-term Chief Justice
Jean Turnage, who served two decades as a state legislator, and
current Justices Jim Rice and Mike Wheat.172
Party affiliations appeared as an issue in the hard-fought
2000 races for chief justice and associate justice, when three of
the four candidates in the general election had histories of

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The six are Albert J. Galen; Wellington D. Rankin; Sam C. Ford; Harrison J.
Freebourn; R.V. Bottomly; and Mike McGrath. Id. John W. Bonner served as Attorney
General before he was elected as Governor, and then to the Supreme Court. See id.
171. Sam V. Stewart and John W. Bonner both served as governor before serving as
justices. Hugh R. Adair served as lieutenant governor before serving as a justice. Sam C.
Ford and Forrest H. Anderson served as justices before serving as governor. Id.
172. Hugh R. Adair, Forrest H. Anderson, John C. Sheehy, Jean A. Turnage, James A.
Rice, and Mike Wheat all served in the legislature before joining the court, and Henry C.
Smith served in the state senate after leaving the bench. Id.
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contributing significant amounts to Democratic candidates.173 In
2008, the supreme court revised the Code of Judicial Conduct to
prevent judicial candidates from attending partisan campaign
events.174 Justice Jim Rice (a former legislator) and Justice John
Warner dissented from the change on grounds that suggest the
informal, background role of partisan politics in past Montana
judicial campaigns. Justice Rice observed that
such practices reflect the reality of Montana culture, particularly within our many small, rural communities. . . . I recall attending a Republican dinner in a rural county which
was also attended by a large contingent of local Democrats.
Everyone was grinning from ear to ear, because it was
more about community than anything else.175

More recently, in a 2010 associate justice contest, Judge Nels
Swandal ran an ad purportedly distancing himself from partisan
politics, explaining his family has “always supported Republican
candidates,” but his “political opinions have never influenced
my decisions.”176 He lost the election, and went on to be elected
as a Republican state senator in 2014.177
After Citizens United, and in an increasingly polarized
partisan atmosphere in the state, judicial elections came to the
forefront of party politics. In 2011 the Montana Legislature
referred to the voters LR-119, a Republican-sponsored measure
carried by a vote that hewed closely to party lines. It was a
legislative referendum (not a constitutional amendment, which
would have required a legislative supermajority) to elect
supreme court justices by districts and select the chief justice by
173. Erin P. Billings, Supreme Court Candidates Give Primarily to Democrats, Helena
Indep. Record, Nov. 2, 2000, available at http://helenair.com/news/local/supreme-courtcandidates-give-primarily-to-democrats/article_581b74e1-80cc-5a96-928a-97caef5d0983.h
tml.
174. In the Matter of the 2008 Montana Code of Judicial Conduct, No. AF 08-0203
(Dec. 12, 2008).
175. Id. at 6–7 (Rice and Warner, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
176. Swandal for Justice, Set the Record Straight, available at BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Buying%20Time
%202010/STSUPCT_MT_SWANDAL_SET_RECORD_STRAIGHT.pdf (accessed Sept.
8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
177 See, e.g., Montana Legislature 64th Session, Nels Swandal (R) SD 30, http://leg.mt.gov
/css/Sessions/64th/leg_info.asp?HouseID=2&SessionID=109&LAWSID=16524 (May 14,
2014) (accessed Sept. 8, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
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majority vote of the justices.178 In a challenge brought by a
group of voters including Constitutional Convention Delegates
Arlyne Reichert, Wade Dahood, and Jean Bowman, the
Supreme Court held the referendum “facially unconstitutional”
because it attempted to amend by statute the constitutional
qualifications for election to justice.179 After the 2012 elections,
several Republican legislative leaders discussed a plan to
“chang[e] the face of the Montana Supreme Court.”180 The focus
on judicial elections became part of developing a “long term
strategy . . . to actually elect a majority of conservatives in both
(the House and Senate), adopt conservative legislation and have
a court that will uphold it.”181
C. Campaign Finance
1. Direct Contributions
Since 1990, which marks the earliest extent of detailed
campaign-finance records in Montana, the average amount of
campaign contributions raised per race by all statewide
candidates in both primary and general elections is about
$231,000 overall and $460,000 in contested elections.182 But the
average supreme court candidate raised about $139,000 overall,
and $212,000 in a contested election,183 which puts supreme
178. See S.B. 268, 2011 MONT. LAWS ch. 203.
179. See Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455, 483 (Mont. 2012).
180. Associated Press, Emails Document GOP Leadership Power Struggle, Missoulian,
Jan 16, 2013, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/montanalegislature/emails-document-gop-leadership-power-struggle/article_ce884f7c-5ffd-11e2-96
b6-0019bb2963f4.html
181. Id.
182. Anthony Johnstone, Montana Supreme Court Campaign-Finance Dataset (on file
with Author) [hereinafter Campaign-Finance Dataset]. The source data are available from
National Institute on Money in State Politics, Contributions to State Supreme Court
Candidates in Elections in Montana Selected Years, available at followthemoney.org,
http://www.followthemoney.org/showme?s=MT&y=2014,2012,2010,2008,2006,2004,2002,
2000,1998,1996,1994,1992,1990&f-core=1&c-exi=1&c-r-ot=J#[{1|gro=d-Ins{4| (2015).
For comparability, all cited amounts from the Campaign-Finance Dataset are adjusted to
2014 dollars and rounded to the nearest thousand. (The adjustment takes the nominal
amount reported for a campaign year, multiplies it by the Consumer Price Index for 2014,
then divides it by the Consumer Price Index for the campaign year.)
183. Calculations for contested elections exclude noncompetitive candidates who raised
less than ten percent of the amount raised by the winning candidate.
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court campaigns near the low end of the second-tier (nongubernatorial) statewide elections in Montana.184 The largest
source of campaign contributions in supreme court elections, not
surprisingly, is lawyers and lobbyists: In inflation-adjusted
terms, supreme court candidates raised about $6.24 million
between 1990 and 2014, and nearly a third of that total—$1.97
million—came from lawyers and lobbyists.185 The other
significant source is the candidates themselves, their
contributions amounting to $1.35 million, or nearly a quarter of
the total.186 Less than six percent of campaign contributions
have come from out-of-state sources.187
Before the rise of independent expenditures after Citizens
United, three supreme court campaigns stand out as the most
expensive in contribution terms. In 1992, Justice Terry
Trieweiler raised $275,000 challenging incumbent Chief Justice
Jean Turnage, who raised $360,000 successfully defending his
seat.188 Two years earlier, Trieweiler had raised the secondhighest total of any judicial candidate in Montana to win a seat
as associate justice in 1990; just more than half of the $452,000
came from his own pockets.189 In 1994 Montana voters
approved I-118, which reduced individual contribution limits for
supreme court candidates from $750 (about $1200 in 2014
dollars) to $200, an amount that is now adjusted for inflation
($320 in 2014).190
Under the lower contribution limits, some candidates relied
more on their own bank accounts and less on individual and
political-committee contributions. In the 2000 election for
associate justice, Justice Patricia Cotter raised $366,000 (most of
it self-financed) to fend off three other candidates in primary and
general elections.191 Also in 2000, Justice Trieweiler ran again
for chief justice, raising $436,000 (again, most of it self184. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (1994); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 44.10.338(1) (2013);
Montana Secretary of State, 1994 Voter Information 26 (discussing I-118).
191. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
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financed) in a contest against his colleague Justice Karla Gray,
who raised $499,000 and won.192 In inflation-adjusted terms,
these were the third-highest and highest fundraising totals for a
Montana court candidate, and at just short of one million dollars,
the campaigns amounted to the most expensive Supreme Court
race then on record.193 In the 2004 contest between Justice
James Nelson and challenger Republican State Representative
Cindy Younkin, Nelson raised about $286,000 to defeat
Younkin, who raised $382,388, putting both candidates in the
top ten for campaign contributions since 1990.194
2. Independent Expenditures
Independent-expenditure records are more limited than
those for direct contributions.195 There is, however, evidence of
significant outside money in races beginning in the competitive
2000 campaigns for chief justice and associate justice, nearly all
of it from the Montana Trial Lawyers Association affiliate, the
Montana Law PAC.196 In that race for chief justice, still the most
expensive in Montana history in terms of direct contributions,
Justice Karla Gray asked her opponent Justice Terry Trieweiler
to oppose independent expenditures in the campaign,
particularly from the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, whose
prior affiliations with Justice Trieweiler gave “the appearance of
an improperly coordinated effort,” according to Justice Gray.197

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. At the time of the elections considered here, Montana regulations interpreted
reportable independent expenditures narrowly to include only “communications expressly
advocating the success or defeat of a candidate,” and not the broader category of reportable
“electioneering communications” in current law. Compare MONT. ADMIN. R.
§ 44.10.323(3) (2013) (defining “independent expenditure” as express advocacy) with
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(15) (2015) (defining “electioneering communication” as
publicly distributed materials referring to “clearly identified candidates”).
196. A 1996 filing suggests that the Montana Law PAC raised about $18,000 (2014
dollars) to support challenger James Regnier. See Montana Commissioner of Political
Practices, Montana Law-Pac, Form C-6 (Jan. 30, 1997) (Closing Report).
197. Erin P. Billings, Gray Asks Trieweiler to Reject Third-Party Spending in Race,
Helena Indep. Record, July 18, 2000, available at http://helenair.com/news/local/gray-asks
-trieweiler-to-reject-third-party-spending-in-race/article_829f8d56-6203-574e-af1d-4f4a9c
79ed5a.html.
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In that year’s race for associate justice, one candidate
complained of a “push poll . . . purportedly being taken by an
unknown national interest group . . . to unjustly influence
Montana voters.”198 In the 2000 campaigns, the Montana Law
PAC sent out mailings supporting Justice Trieweiler at a cost of
about $82,000 and Justice Patricia Cotter at a cost of about
$85,000.199 The Montana Law PAC also spent $150,000 in
support of two candidates in the 2002 campaign; recent
appointee Jim Rice, who ran unopposed, and Justice William
Leaphart, who faced a challenger and enjoyed significant
support from trial lawyer contributions.200
In a bitter 2004 campaign for one of two associate justice
seats, the Montana Law PAC raised significant amounts of
money to support Justice James Nelson in anticipation of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce entering the race on behalf of his
challenger, Republican State Representative Cindy Younkin.201
It spent as much as $409,000 that year,202 prompting Younkin to
claim that “[t]he Montana trial lawyers bought the race, and I
think that’s a sad commentary on the state of judicial affairs in
Montana.”203 One commentator noted that “a Younkin victory

198. Erin P. Billings, Tweeten Asks Cotter to Disavow National Poll, Missoulian, Sept.
8, 2000, available at http://missoulian.com/uncategorized/tweeten-asks-cotter-to-disavownational-poll/article_2820aa41-2226-541e-bad5-23a7c2a2f591.html.
199. Erin P. Billings, Gray Files Complaint over State Trial Lawyer Mailing, Billings
Gazette, Nov. 4, 2000, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/gray-files-complaintover-state-trial-lawyer-mailing/article_ea448fc9-ee5f-544d-8c3a-c60e24fcec24.html.
200. Mike Dennison, “Outside Money” Haunts Court Race, Great Falls Tribune, Sept.
27, 2004, available at http://archive.greatfallstribune.com/news/stories/20040927/localnews
/1310006.html (indicating that “[t]he Montana Law PAC spent $150,000 on ads and
literature to help two Supreme Court candidates in 2002”); Campaign-Finance Dataset,
supra note 182.
201. Dennison, supra note 200; Shaila Dewan, Montana Judicial Race Joins Big-Money
Fray, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2014, at A11 (quoting the executive director of the trial
lawyers’ group about the 2004 race, who characterized its work in that election as “trying
to ensure that candidates were credible and had experience with Montana law,” and who
noted that “the challenger was inexperienced and the group anticipated a large amount of
spending from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that never materialized”).
202. Dewan, supra note 201 (reporting on “a 2004 race in which the Montana Trial
Lawyers Association contributed $326,000 to retain a justice, James C. Nelson”);
Dennison, supra n. 200 (reporting in September that “[t]he Law PAC had $138,000 in its
account as of June, and its next report isn’t due until late October.”).
203. Len Iwanski, Younkin: Trial Lawyers ‘Bought the Race’ for Nelson; Morris Beats
McLean, Assoc. Press, Nov. 2, 2004, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and
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could tip the political balance of the seven-member court in a
direction favored by business interests and law enforcement,”
but the Chamber did not appear.204 Several races from 2006
through 2010 either were uncontested or did not appear to
involve significant independent expenditures. As the Montana
Trial Lawyers Association executive director told the New York
Times during the 2014 campaign, “[i]n 2006, 2008, ‘10, ‘12, we
didn’t spend anything—nothing, zero.”205
The first Montana Supreme Court campaign waged entirely
after Citizens United came in 2012, when independent
expenditures played a larger role and raised new questions about
so-called dark-money groups. Associate Justice James Nelson
announced his retirement in early 2011, noting that judicial
campaigns “are expensive, time consuming and increasingly
partisan.”206 Three candidates announced: trial lawyer Elizabeth
Best, district court judge Laurie McKinnon, and criminal
defense attorney Ed Sheehy. In the primary, Best raised more
money than the other two candidates combined, most of it from
other lawyers and her own funding, but finished a close third in
what was nearly a three-way tie.207 The Montana Trial Lawyers
Association provided significant support through its members’
contributions to Best’s campaign, but did not make independent
expenditures in the primary.208 Best’s loss in the primary
surprised observers, some of whom credited Sheehy’s name

-regional/montana/younkin-trial-lawyers-bought-the-race-for-nelson-morris-beats/article_1
277e654-8312-5a0f-ad31-e75b59096ce7.html.
204. Dennison, supra note 200; see also Ray Ring, State Judges Get Political: SpecialInterest Money Pours into Hotly Contested Judge Campaigns, High Country News, Oct.
11, 2004, available at http://www.hcn.org/issues/284/15051.
205. Dewan, supra note 201.
206. Associated Press, Montana Supreme Court Justice Nelson to Retire, Billings
Gazette, Feb. 1, 2011, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/mont
ana/montana-supreme-court-justice-nelson-to-retire/article_e3f72dcc-2e33-11e0-b328-001c
cc4c002e0.html.
207. Michael Beckel, Judicial Candidate Blames Mystery Nonprofit’s Attacks for Defeat,
Center for Public Integrity (May 16, 2013), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
013/05/16/12656/judicial-candidate-blames-mystery-nonprofits-attacks-defeat; CampaignFinance Dataset, supra note 182.
208. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182; Dewan, supra note 201 (quoting
Montana Trial Lawyers Association executive director’s summary of independent
expenditures: “In 2006, 2008, ’10, ’12, we didn’t spend anything—nothing, zero”).
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recognition as the nephew of a longtime Montana Supreme
Court Justice John “Skeff” Sheehy.209
The decisive factors included mailers from an organization
called the Montana Growth Network, which criticized Best and
Sheehy for past campaign contributions to Democrats and
praised McKinnon as “the only non-partisan choice for supreme
court justice.”210 That group was founded by a Republican state
senator, and in the general election it sent two additional mailers
attacking Sheehy.211 Although the group disclosed spending
about $42,000 on the mailers in the primary—more than either
McKinnon or Sheehy raised in their own primary campaigns—it
did not disclose its general election expenditures.212 Tax filings
show that the group spent about $690,000 that year on ads
concerning “judicial fairness” as well as “energy and the
environment, taxes and the economy and healthcare,” and raised
most of its funds from five unnamed donors including four
contributions of more than $100,000.213 A significant amount of
that spending bought mailers and broadcast advertisements
attacking Sheehy in the general election.214 American Tradition
Partnership also entered the campaign with a major mailing
attacking Sheehy, a development perhaps related to a more than
$50,000 transfer it received that year from Montana Growth
209. Charles S. Johnson, Dissecting a Montana Primary of Surprises, Crossover Voters,
Ravalli Republic, June 9, 2012, available at http://ravallirepublic.com/news/state-and-region
al/article_31bce989-b1ff-5899-9bc6-ffb102777ccd1.html.
210. Beckel, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. Id.; Michael Beckel, Montana State Senators Raise Big Bucks with Secretive
Nonprofit; Conservative Montana Growth Network Spent Heavily during Supreme Court
Elections, Helena Indep. Record, May 4, 2014, available at http://helenair.com/news/local
/montana-state-senators-raise-big-bucks-with-secretive-nonprofit/article_03c4fc80-d352-11
e3-8f16-0019bb2963f4.html (indicating that the group’s general-election expenditures
“went unreported with state regulators because it did not explicitly urge people to cast their
votes against Sheehy”).
213. Montana Growth Network, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax (2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/05/03/14709/montana-growth-networkfiling [hereinafter MGN 990] (accessed Sept. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
214. See, e.g., Mike Dennison, Pro-Business Group’s Ad Attacks Montana Supreme
Court Candidate on Death Penalty, Missoulian, Oct. 16, 2012, available at http://missoulian
.com/news/state-and-regional/pro-business-group-s-ad-attacks-montana-supreme-court-can
didate/article_4af2a4cc-17f1-11e2-b259-001a4bcf887a.html; Beckel, supra note 207;
Beckel, supra note 212.
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Network.215 McKinnon disavowed the attacks on her opponent,
saying “[m]udslinging diminishes the prestige of our highest
court.”216 While the sources and total amount of independent
expenditures in the 2012 Supreme Court race may never be
determined,217 the scope of that activity set the stage for the
2014 judicial campaigns.
IV. A JUDICIAL ELECTION IN THE AFTERMATH
OF CITIZENS UNITED: PARTISANSHIP, OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS,
AND DARK MONEY
A. The Setting
Weeks after newly appointed Justice Mike Wheat took the
bench in January 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued
Citizens United. The case concerned federal elections, but also
would affect the states in general, Montana in particular, and
especially the Montana Supreme Court. Due in large part to its
history of corporate corruption, including corruption of
judges,218 Montana led twenty-six states in an amicus brief
urging the Supreme Court not to reach the regulation of
corporate electioneering in the states.219 The states drew on the
recent case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, in which
the Court held that “significant and disproportionate” campaign
215. Mike Dennison, Montana Supreme Court Candidate Disavows Negative Ads,
Missoulian, Oct. 30, 2012, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/
montana-supreme-court-candidate-disavows-negative-ads/article_079c224-22f2-11e2-afd8
-0019bb2963f4.html; MGN 990, supra note 213.
216. Dennison, supra note 215.
217. Several campaign practice complaints against the Montana Growth Network remain
pending before the state’s Commissioner of Political Practices. See Montana Commissioner
of Political Practices, Docket of Formal Complaints, Driscoll v Montana Growth Network
COPP-2013-CFP-0011, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/Driscollv
MTGrowthNetworkComplaint; Van Hyning v Montana Growth Network COPP-2013-CFP
-0005, http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/VanHyningvMTGrowthNet
workComplaint; Hamlett v Montana Growth Network, Inc. COPP-2012-CFP-0053, http:/
/political practices.mt.gov/content/2recentdecisions/HamlettvMTGrowthNetworkIncCompl
aint (all accessed Sept. 10, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
218. See supra Section II(B).
219. See generally Brief for the States of Montana, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Citizens United v. F.E.C., 2009 WL 2365205.
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funds, including independent expenditures like those at issue in
Citizens United, amounted to a violation of due process.220 “In
the majority of states with judicial elections at some level,
corporate-electioneering laws help ensure that such situations
remain ‘extraordinary’ acts of a single individual,” the states
argued, “rather than business as usual.”221
In holding that contribution limits in the federal election
law violated the First Amendment, the Citizens United Court did
not address judicial elections. Instead, in a crucial passage
narrowing the definition of corruption, it arguably relied on a
principle that was inapplicable to judicial elections: “It is in the
nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and,
by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who
support those policies.”222 In other words, “[t]he fact that
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials
does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”223 And yet, as
Professor Larry Howell observes, “if the elected officials in
question are judges, it means exactly that.”224 Justice Stevens
noted in dissent that “[a]t a time when concerns about the
conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch, . . . the
Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union
general treasury spending in these races.”225
The states accepted Citizens United, including its
consequences for judicial elections, except for Montana. The
state chose to defend its prohibition on corporate electioneering,
which dated back to the popularly enacted 1912 Corrupt

220. Id. at *15–*16 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884
(2009)).
221. Id. at *16 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Justice at Stake et al., Citizens United v. F.E.C., 2009 WL 2365225 at *2 (arguing that
“[e]liminating states’ longstanding ability to regulate corporate influence on judicial
elections will cripple these essential reform efforts [aimed at “shoring up the public’s
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges”] and exacerbate the
recent explosion of special interest pressure on the courts”).
222. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (quoting McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S. 93, 297
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
223. Id.
224. Howell, supra note 21, at 59.
225. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (recognizing in addition that
“[t]he majority of the States select their judges through popular elections”).
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Practices Act.226 A secretive organization called Western
Tradition Partnership led a challenge to the law.227 The
plaintiffs’ activities focused on the legislature, and they did not
openly seek to spend corporate funds in judicial campaigns.228
Yet the consequences for electing judges were clear.
Ironically, perhaps, it took an elected court to comprehend
the implications of Citizens United for state judiciaries. On
December 30, 2011, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the
state law in Western Tradition, distinguishing Citizens United:
“Clearly Montana has unique and compelling interests to protect
through preservation of this statute.”229 Among those
distinguishing interests the court counted “corporate influence,
sparse population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive
resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and
low campaign costs,” which combine to “make Montana
especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to
the detriment of democracy and the republican form of
government.”230
The Court also addressed judicial elections in detail. It
recalled Heinze’s corrupt judges in Butte.231 It cited polls
showing that three out of four Americans “believe that campaign
contributions affect judicial decisions in states where judges are
elected.”232 It even quoted Mark Twain’s quip about Copper
King William Clark, who “is said to have bought legislatures
and judges as other men buy food and raiment. By his example
he has so excused and so sweetened corruption that in Montana
226. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2010) (“A corporation may not make a
contribution or an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”); see also 1913 MONT. LAWS 604
(prohibiting certain business corporations from “pay[ing] or contribut[ing] in order to aid,
promote or prevent the nomination or election of any person”); Wiltse, supra note 21.
227. W. Tradition P’ship., Inc. v. Atty. Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2011) (confirming
that the organization’s stated purpose is “to solicit and anonymously spend the funds of
other corporations, individuals and entities to influence the outcome of Montana elections”), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship., Inc. v. Bullock, ___
U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
228. Id. at 6–7.
229. Id. at 11.
230. Western Tradition, 271 P.3d at 11.
231. Id. at 8.
232. Id. at 10 (citing JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
2000–2009 (Charles Hall ed., 2010)).
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it no longer has an offensive smell.”233 Thus, the Court
concluded, the state’s preservation of clean judicial elections
and an independent judiciary are compelling interests: “[T]he
free speech rights of the corporations are no more important than
the due process rights of litigants in Montana courts to a fair and
independent judiciary, and both are constitutionally
protected.”234 It found support for this defense of an
independent, fair, and impartial judiciary in Caperton, noting the
United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgement there that
“[j]udicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the
highest order.”235
Sounding a broader theme of the state’s vulnerability due to
its relatively low-cost elections and high-value resources, the
Court also noted that “the total expenditure for media
advertising was about $60,000” in the last race for chief justice,
compared to corporations’ capacity to spend millions.236 Finally,
the court turned to former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s thenrecent statement that a “crisis of confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary is real and growing,” in large part because of “the
extraordinary spending power of ‘super spender groups,’ which
are mostly corporate funded.”237
Even the two dissenting justices only reluctantly conceded
that Citizens United was controlling. Justice Beth Baker sought a
saving construction of the Montana law “to preserve what
remains of its constitutionality and to further the legislature’s
underlying intent to prevent corruption.”238 Justice James C.
Nelson, noting that he “never had to write a more frustrating
dissent,” expressed his disapproval of Citizens United at length
while nonetheless acknowledging “the applicability of a
controlling precedent with which I profoundly disagree.”239
Justice Nelson doubted that “the Supreme Court will allow a
state to single out corporations as a group and prohibit them
233. Id. at 11 (quoting MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN IN ERUPTION 72 (1940)).
234. Id. at 12.
235. Id. (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
236. Id. at 13.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 14 (Baker, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 18 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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from speaking in judicial elections,” even as he noted that he
“share[d] some of the . . . concerns”240 raised by the Western
Tradition majority.
The nation took notice of the Montana Supreme Court’s
ruling.241 The Supreme Court also took notice, staying the state
court decision pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.242 In
an unusual statement concurring in the stay, Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justice Breyer, sounded agreement with the Montana
court that “Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere,”
warranted reconsideration of Citizens United.243 Less than six
months later, however, the Supreme Court issued an
extraordinary summary reversal of the Montana court’s
decision.244 With a curt citation to the Supremacy Clause the
Court held that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that “the
holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law.”245
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, voted to deny the petition, asserting that “this Court’s
legal conclusion should not bar the Montana Supreme Court’s
finding, made on the record before it, that independent
expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the
appearance of corruption in Montana.”246
As in Citizens United, the Supreme Court’s one-paragraph
opinion in American Tradition did not address judicial elections
even though the State of Montana and several amici, like the

240. Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., George F. Will, Montana Attempts to Buck the Supreme Court on Citizens
United, Wash. Post, May 30, 2012, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/montana-attempts-to-buck-the-supreme-court-on-citizens-united/2012/05/30/gJQA4DCi2U
U_story.html; Editorial, Montana Takes on Citizens United, N.Y. Times Jan. 23, 2012, at
A26; Jess Bravin, Montana Tests Supreme Court Political Spending Ruling, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702043681045771
39100369896494.
242. See Order in Pending Case, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, No. 11A762 (Feb. 17,
2012).
243. Id. (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring in issuance of stay).
244. American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012)
(per curiam); see also Anthony Johnstone, The State of the Republican Form of
Government in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 5, 14 (2013) (“The decision appears to be the
first time in decades that a divided Court summarily reversed a state court to invalidate a
state law on constitutional grounds.”).
245. Id. at 2491.
246. Id. (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., voting to deny certiorari).
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Montana Supreme Court itself, highlighted the consequences of
unlimited corporate and union campaign expenditures for the
selection of judges and justices in most states.247 Judicial
elections, Montana argued, were “wholly unexamined in
Citizens United,” and “[n]ot even Petitioners claim a right to
influence judicial campaigns through corporate expenditures, yet
their arguments sweep broadly enough to undermine the
integrity of the judicial system as much as the political
system.”248 Eight of the eleven then-living retired justices of the
Montana Supreme Court argued that “[e]normous special
interest expenditures in state judicial elections are threatening
one of the Constitution’s most central guarantees—the right to
due process and a fair trial.”249
Beyond Montana, constitutional scholars noted that “[i]t is
difficult to imagine that the Court intended to foreclose
evaluation of whether judicial elections present compelling
government interests in a case that did not involve judicial
elections.”250 Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
argued that state judges, unlike the presidential and
congressional candidates who were the subject of the campaigns
at issue in Citizens United, “are not ‘representatives’ with
offices open to the public, and outside influence by major
campaign spenders is not recognized as a legitimate factor in
judicial decision-making.”251 The Court did not engage these
arguments about the implications of Citizens United for judicial
elections, but instead noted generally that “Montana’s arguments
in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in
Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”252

247. See generally Br. in Opp. of Montana, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1853622 [hereinafter Montana Brief]; Amicus Br. of Retired
Justices of the Mont. Sup. Ct. and Justice at Stake in Support of Resps., Am. Tradition
P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1829056 [hereinafter Montana
Justices’ Brief].
248. Montana Brief, supra note 247, at 25–26.
249. Montana Justices’ Brief, supra note 247, at 3.
250. Amicus Br. of Walter Dellinger and James Sample in Support of Resps. at 8, Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1863412.
251. Amicus Br. of New York, et al. in Support of Resps. at 17, Am. Tradition P’ship v.
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012), 2012 WL 1853624.
252. American Tradition, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
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American Tradition blazed a trail for other challenges
following the reasoning of Citizens United.253 Having learned
from the Montana Supreme Court a lesson about challenging
election laws before state judges with first-hand experience of
elections, litigants turned to the more favorable forum of
appointed judges in the federal courts. One of the first laws to
fall after the 1912 Corrupt Practices Act was Montana’s 1935
non-partisan judicial election law, which made it unlawful for a
political party to “endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure
to support or oppose a judicial candidate.” 254 In a challenge
brought by a county Republican Committee, the Ninth Circuit
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the law.255 Relying on
Citizens United, the court applied strict scrutiny to the speakerbased restriction,256 and held that the law was likely to fail the
narrow-tailoring requirement. Its ban on partisan endorsements
was overbroad because
[i]f Montana were concerned that party endorsements
might undermine elected judges’ independence, Montana
could appoint its judges, with a bipartisan and expert panel
making nominations—a less restrictive alternative currently
practiced by several states.257

The partisan-endorsement ban also was under-inclusive because
“it forbids judicial endorsements by political parties but not by
other associations, individuals, corporations, special interest
groups, and the like.”258 The court concluded that “Montana
must be enjoined forthwith from enforcing [the statute] or
otherwise interfering with a political party’s right to endorse

253. See Johnstone, supra note 244, at 11–12 (discussing challenges to state election
laws following American Tradition); see also Cox v. McLean, 49 F. Supp. 3d 765, 768 (D.
Mont. 2014) (preliminarily enjoining state law prohibiting complainant’s publication of his
complaint to the Judicial Standards Commission). Most recently, and with significant
consequences for judicial elections—among others—in Montana, the Ninth Circuit
remanded a challenge to the state’s contribution limits for consideration of whether they
meet the narrower quid pro quo corruption interest identified in Citizens United. See Lair v.
Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (amending and superseding opinion first reported at
787 F.3d 989).
254. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-231.
255. Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012).
256. Id. at 745–46.
257. Id. at 746.
258. Id. at 747.
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judicial candidates and to expend monies to publicize such
endorsements.”259 Thus, Montana’s judicial elections not only
had to be political, they had to be partisan too.
Judge Mary Schroeder dissented from what she noted was
the first case “to hold that even though a state has chosen a nonpartisan judicial selection process, political parties have a right
to endorse candidates.”260 The result, she wrote, was that
“parties can work to secure judges’ commitments to the parties’
agendas in contravention of the non-partisan goal the state has
chosen for its selection process.”261 Partisan influence, Judge
Schroeder explained, is “particularly pernicious because parties
serve as ‘natural bundling agents that coordinate sprawling
political coalitions across all types of policy domains and
venues,’”262 and their power to make unlimited independent
expenditures for or against judicial candidates under Citizens
United “threatens to further erode state judges’ ability to act
independently and impartially.”263 In early 2014, the Supreme
Court denied Montana’s petition for certiorari,264 declining
another opportunity to address judicial elections after Citizens
United. Like the Supreme Court’s breach of the 100-year-old
Corrupt Practices Act, this decision would lead within a matter
of months to a flood of new money into Montana elections.
B. The Candidates and Issues
The 2014 campaign of Mike Wheat and Lawrence
VanDyke produced a contest between two lawyers who were
born elsewhere but quickly moved to southwestern Montana.
There the similarities ended. Wheat returned home after service
259. Id. at 749.
260. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 750 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael S. Kang & Joanna M.
Sheperd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 107 (2011)).
263. Id. at 751 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit later clarified that its
decision invalidated the prohibition on party endorsements and independent expenditures,
but not the prohibition on party contributions to candidates. See Sanders Cnty. Republican
Cent. Comm. v. Fox, 717 F. 3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013).
264. Fox v. Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1345
(2014) (denying certiorari).
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as a marine in Vietnam for law school at the University of
Montana and a short stint as a state prosecutor. VanDyke left
Montana for Harvard Law School and a clerkship on the D.C.
Circuit. Wheat had been a plaintiff’s attorney in Montana trial
courts for three decades. VanDyke was in his first decade of
practice, having started as an appellate attorney at a national
firm. Wheat eventually entered politics as an elected Democratic
state senator and later lost a campaign for state attorney general.
VanDyke never served in elective office, but was attracted to the
high-profile legal docket of the Republican Texas Attorney
General’s office before landing an appointed position under the
newly elected Republican Montana Attorney General. These
biographical differences would become the foundation of the
core political differences in the campaign.
1. Mike Wheat
Mike Wheat was born in Spokane, Washington in 1947,
and moved to Montana in 1948.265 He graduated from the
University of Montana School of Law, after which he served as
a deputy county attorney in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana,
for three years.266 For nearly three decades he practiced
“plaintiff-oriented and appellate litigation, with an emphasis on
personal injury, product liability and insurance-related claims,”
in a firm he founded with a law-school classmate in Bozeman,
Montana.267 From 2003 to 2007 he served one four-year term in
the Montana Senate as a Democrat, chairing the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 2005.268 In 2008 he ran unsuccessfully in the
Democratic primary for state attorney general.269 Wheat was one
of eleven applicants to fill the associate justice seat opened by
265. Charles S. Johnson, Bozeman’s Mike Wheat Appointed to Montana’s Supreme
Court, Missoulian, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/bozemans-mike-wheat-appointed-to-montana-supreme-court/article_6464ff9a-efea-11de-95a0-001c
c4c03286.html.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Charles S. Johnson, Montana Supreme Court Race; Wheat Touts Years of
Experience, Missoulian, Oct. 19, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/montana-supreme-court-race-wheat-touts-years-of-experience/article_8a182a04-58
14-11e4-82be-b7c7a1293861.html.
269. Johnson, supra note 265.
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the retirement of Justice John Warner, and one of three finalists
to emerge as a nominee from the state Judicial Nomination
Commission process.270 Governor Brian Schweitzer, a
Democrat, appointed Wheat to fill the remainder of Justice
Warner’s eight-year term ending in 2014, subject to an initial
election in 2010.271 In a 2010 uncontested retention election,
voters retained Justice Wheat with seventy-eight percent of the
vote. 272
In his 2014 campaign for a new term, Wheat ran on “four
decades of legal and public service experience,” as well as his
time on the Montana Supreme Court.273 He argued that “the
rights afforded to us by the Constitution of Montana deserve a
strong and independent guardian,” and focused specifically on
his defense of the distinctive state constitutional right to “a clean
and healthful environment” as well as public access to land and
water.274 As the campaign progressed, Wheat emphasized what
he called a “depth of professional and personal experience in life
that I think helps me develop what I call judicial common sense
and just understanding of what’s going on in the case,” in
implicit contrast to an opponent who was twenty-five years
younger.275 In response to criticisms of his decisions by the U.S.

270. Id.
271. Id. Justice Wheat became the second former legislator on the court, joining Justice
Jim Rice, who served three terms as a Republican state representative before his
appointment and subsequent election. Jennifer McKee, Lawyer, Ex-Legislator Sworn in as
Justice, Billings Gazette, Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/stateand-regional/montana/lawyer-ex-legislator-sworn-in-as-justice/article_902b9e3a-fa86-11de
-9e48-001cc4c03286.html. Chief Justice Mike McGrath was previously elected as a
Democrat for state attorney general, and Justice James C. Nelson was previously elected as
a Democrat for county attorney (though Nelson was appointed to the court by Republican
Governor Marc Racicot). Id.; see also Anthony Johnstone, The Hercules of Helena: Justice
James C. Nelson and the Jurisprudence of Principle, 75 MONT. L. REV. 199, 201 (2014).
272. MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, 2010 STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTION
CANVASS 6-1, available at http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Archives/2010s/2010/2010_General
_Election_Official_Statewide_Canvass.pdf (accessed Sept. 18, 2015; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
273. See Mike Wheat for Justice, http://www.wheatforjustice.com/, archived at https://
web.archive.org/web/20141013014020/http://www.wheatforjustice.com/ (accessed Sept. 18,
2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
274. Id.; see also MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) (“The state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.”).
275. Johnson, supra note 268.
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Chamber of Commerce, Wheat cited an eighty-five percent
approval level in the court’s anonymous biennial survey of
lawyers.276 “The chamber is more of a political organization,”
Wheat argued, suggesting that its policy views make it better
suited to lobbying the legislature.277 In general, Wheat rejected
any complaints that he might bring a particular agenda to the
court, noting that the justices act collectively and mostly
unanimously.278 Interestingly, he also criticized Citizens United
and echoed traditional concerns about “outside influences” in
judicial races, explaining that “[w]e Montanans have an
independent attitude and we don’t want outside corporations or
special interest group[s] telling us how to run our affairs.”279
Wheat received endorsements from major newspapers,280 as well
as from the public-employee and teachers union MEA-AFT and
the environmental advocacy group Montana Conservation
Voters.281
276. Id.; see also U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE
LIABILITY SYSTEMS SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE 7 (2012) (ranking Montana forty-fifth
among states for their “legal climate”), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform
.com/uploads/sites/1/Lawsuit_Climate_Report_2012.pdf; MONTANA SUPREME COURT,
MONTANA SUPREME COURT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, 2014 Bench and Bar Survey 2
(2014) (showing that, averaged across ten performance measures, eighty-five percent of
404 respondent judges, law faculty, and attorneys agreed that the court performed well),
available at http://courts.mt.gov/portals/113/supreme/measures/2014/bar-survey14.pdf.
277. Johnson, supra note 268.
278. Id.
279. Wheat, VanDyke Compete for Supreme Court Post, Great Falls Tribune, Oct. 11,
2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/2014/10/12/wheat-vandyke
-compete-supreme-court-post/17068781/.
280. Gazette Opinion: Let’s Keep Rice, Wheat on Supreme Court, Billings Gazette, Oct.
7, 2014, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/gazette-opinion/
gazette-opinion-let-s-keep-rice-wheat-on-supreme-court/article_f38ff427-a3d1-567f-8591f52f00e67487.html (“The Montana Supreme Court must remain a venue where a former
GOP lawmaker and a former Democratic lawmaker can work together, put aside personal
biases and make fair, just decisions for the people of Montana. Voters will get that result if
they return Rice and Wheat to the court.”); Editorial: Wheat, Rice Deserve Support for
Montana’s Supreme Court, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Oct. 2, 2014, available at http:/
/www.bozemandailychronicle.com/opinions/editorials/editorial-wheat-rice-deserve-support
-for- montana - s -supreme - court/article _ 8939c216-4a43-11e4-947e-6b1003c5c88e.html
(“Wheat and Rice have both served with distinction. And they bring balance to the high
court. Both were appointed to fill the terms of retiring justices—Rice by Republican Gov.
Judy Martz, Wheat by Democratic Gov. Brian Schweitzer.”).
281. See Election 2014: Who Are the Recommended Candidates? MEA-AFT Public
Schools Public Service (Oct. 2014), http://www.mea-mft.org/Articles/election_2014_who_
are_the_recommended_candidates.aspx; 2014 MCV Endorsed Candidates, MONTANA
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2. Lawrence Van Dyke
Lawrence VanDyke was born in Midland, Texas, in 1972
and moved to Montana in 1973.282 He graduated from Harvard
Law School in 2005, after which he clerked for Judge Janice
Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit, and then spent five years
practicing business litigation and working on pro bono cases for
groups supporting civil and religious liberty causes with the
national law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington,
D.C., and Texas.283 In 2012, VanDyke became an assistant
solicitor general in the office of Republican Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott—an office noted for a leading role in
constitutional challenges and defenses consistent with the state’s
conservative politics, and for developing alumni, including U.S.
Senator Ted Cruz, who are influential in Republican politics.284
Newly elected Republican Montana Attorney General Tim Fox
tapped VanDyke in 2013 to serve as solicitor general in his
administration. Van Dyke left the post after eighteen months,
“saying he had disagreements with co-workers over his
approach to the job.”285

CONSERVATION VOTERS (n.d.), http://mtvoters.org/node/2161 (both accessed Sept. 18,
2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
282. Charles S. Johnson, VanDyke Cites Experience, Criticizes Wheat as ResultOriented, Missoulian, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/vandyke-cites-experience-criticizes-wheat-as-result-oriented/article_a85a5b9c-501
1f-11e4-ad31-c3d720ff006c.html.
283. Mike Dennison, Montana Supreme Court Candidate VanDyke Says Appeals Are
Focus, Missoulian, Oct. 30, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/montana-supreme-court-candidate-vandyke-says-appeals-are-focus/article_39b9c6
40-5854-5fed-8158-060ae2f771bd.html.
284. Johnson, supra note 282; see also, e.g., Alex Wilts, Ted Cruz Longest-Serving
Solicitor General of Texas, Jerry Falwell Said, Austin-American Statesman: PolitiFact
Texas (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2015/mar/25/jerryfalwell/ted-cruz-longest-serving-solicitor-general-texas-j/ (indicating that Ted Cruz was
solicitor general in Texas for more than five years) (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
285. Dennison, supra note 283. One of VanDyke’s former colleagues told a reporter that
“I just don’t think he has the maturity or the work ethic to aspire to this position.” Matt Volz,
Colleague Questions Candidate’s Skills for Montana Supreme Court, A.P., Oct. 25, 2014,
available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/colleague-questions-candidate-sskills-for-montana-supreme-court/article_6cdf44c8-1b41-5390-a83d-604622ecd1ee.html.
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VanDyke’s campaign emphasized his experience in
appellate and constitutional litigation.286 His campaign slogan
was “Following the Law, Not the Politics,” and his campaign
materials highlighted Wheat’s partisan political background
while de-emphasizing the partisan alignments in his own
career.287 VanDyke reportedly declined to answer “whether he’s
a partisan conservative warrior,” and instead explained that
“[j]ob one for judges is to put that tendency [to let personal
biases influence decisions] aside and not apply your own
preferences.”288 He said that he decided to run because “working
as the state’s top appeals and constitutional lawyer, I came to the
conclusion that my opponent Mike Wheat has failed to live up to
the essential requirement of complete neutrality.”289 “My
problem with Mike Wheat is not that he’s a liberal Democrat,”
VanDyke told a reporter, “[m]y problem is he judges like a
liberal Democrat”290 In interviews, he repeatedly cited the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce report and criticized what he called the
court’s unpredictability in business cases.291 VanDyke received
endorsements from the Montana Chamber of Commerce, the
Montana Association of Realtors, Montana Contractors
Association, the Montana Farm Bureau Federation, and the
National Rifle Association.292

286. Johnson, supra note 282
287. vandykeforjustice.com, Van Dyke for Justice (n.d.), archived at https://web.archive
.org/web/20141017104149/http://vandykeforjustice.com/view/compare/ (accessed Sept. 21,
2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
288. Dennison, supra note 283; Johnson, supra note 282.
289. Great Falls Tribune, supra note 279.
290. Mike Dennison, Wheat’s Record under Attack: What’s Really in the Record?
DailyInterLake.com (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.dailyinterlake.com/news/local_elections/
wheat-s-record-under-attack-what-s-actually-in-the/article_a9f59eac-6155-11e4-98ad-3b38
e855072b.html (indicating as well that Van Dyke thought the most significant issue in the
race was how “activist or agenda-driven judging undermines our entire system of
government”) (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
291. Johnson, supra note 282; Dennison, supra note 283.
292. Johnson, supra note 282 (mentioning the Chamber of Commerce, Realtors,
Contractors, and Farm Bureau endorsements); Debating Who Won, Plus NRA Likes
VanDyke, Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 30, 2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune
.com/story/opinion/2014/09/30/debating-won-plus-nra-likes-vandyke/16516839/
(noting
that its endorsement of Van Dyke was the NRA’s “only endorsement of any judicial
candidate in Montana for 2014”).
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C. The Qualifications Challenge: Cross v. Van Dyke
Both candidates made their experience as practicing
lawyers a primary qualification for serving on the bench, and
each criticized his opponent for a lack of relevant experience.
Pointing to his own specialized appellate experience, VanDyke
said “I don’t think it would hurt to have at least one on our court
that focuses on appellate and constitutional issues.”293 Wheat
responded that “it’s not the kind of job that demands a
constitutional specialist,” given that the court faced a much
broader docket of issues of which constitutional law is just a
part.294 Wheat also criticized VanDyke’s lack of trial experience,
stating that Wheat was himself the candidate who “has the kind
of experience in the area of law that’s required for this kind of a
position.”295 VanDyke’s response was that Wheat’s long
experience on the plaintiffs’ side of cases made him too
sympathetic to trial lawyers.296 Early in the campaign, these
political issues about experience became a legal question
because the Montana Constitution requires judges to be
“admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five
years prior to the date of appointment or election.”297
While VanDyke was admitted to the State Bar of Montana
in 2005, he took inactive status—a class of bar membership for
lawyers who “are not engaged in the practice of law in
Montana”—in 2007.298 Less than two weeks after VanDyke
filed for office in March 2014, he was sued for lack of
qualification under the “admitted to the practice of law in

293. Johnson, supra note 282; see also Volz, supra note 285 (“We’ve got lots of people
with lots of trial experience on the court,” VanDyke said. “I think what we need is somebody who actually focuses on the law and the constitution, has some expertise in that.”).
294. Johnson, supra note 282 (reporting that “[t]he Supreme Court Clerk’s office said
that since January 2006, the court has had only 34 out of 6,602 cases in which a party gives
notice to the court that a constitutional issue is at question.”) The figure reported in this
story understates the constitutional caseload, however, because the notice requirement
applies only to “a party who challenges the constitutionality of any act of the Montana
legislature,” or facial challenges to laws, and does not apply to the constitutionality of
executive actions or local laws. See MONT. R. APP. P. 27.
295. Dennison, supra note 283.
296. Dennison, supra note 290.
297. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 9(1).
298. Cross v. VanDyke, 332 P. 3d 215, 216 (Mont. 2014).
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Montana” provision.299 The district court disqualified VanDyke,
excluding him from the primary ballot.300 VanDyke attacked the
suit as “brought by Mike Wheat campaign donors to eliminate
competition by lawsuit.”301
On appeal, Justice Wheat and Chief Justice McGrath, who
each had contributed $200 to Wheat’s campaign, recused
themselves.302 Considering the case without them, a divided
Supreme Court reversed in a four-to-three vote.303 The court
framed the issue as “whether VanDyke’s decision to take
inactive status with the State Bar of Montana while he practiced
law in other states disqualifies him from meeting the
constitutional requirement of admission to the practice of law in
Montana for five years prior to the election.”304 The majority,
Justice Baker writing for the court, focused on the word
“admitted” and held that bar membership—active or inactive—
satisfied that requirement.305 The court concluded that the

299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Charles S. Johnson, Judge Orders Montana Supreme Court Candidate Removed
from Ballot, Missoulian, Apr. 24, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local
/judge-orders-montana-supreme-court-candidate-removed-from-ballot/article_4ff9de60-ccc
a-11e3-ba8b-0019bb2963f4.html. Two of the five plaintiffs, Wade Dahood and Michael
McKeon, and one of their attorneys, Gene Jarussi, had contributed to the Wheat campaign.
See, e.g., Contributions to Mike Wheat: 2014 Supreme Court – 2, followthemoney.org
(n.d.), http://followthemoney.org/ (accessed Sept. 21, 2015; copy of main page on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) (click “start here,” then enter individual
contributors’ names to find records).
302. Charles S. Johnson, Court to VanDyke: McGrath, Wheat Already Recused Selves,
Billings Gazette, May 7, 2014, available at http://billingsgazette.com/news/governmentand-politics/court-to-vandyke-mcgrath-wheat-already-recused-selves/article_4847f972-4d9
6-5a1a-943a-0e16767ae3b1.html.
303. See generally Tyler Stockton, Note, Cross v. VanDyke: Admitted Only Means
Admitted, 75 MONT. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2014) (summarizing facts, background, and
opinions, and analyzing reasoning) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
304. Cross, 332 P.3d at 215–16.
305. Id. The court contrasted this qualification for justices with the constitutional
qualification for attorney general, which requires “active practice [of law] for at least five
years before election.” Id. at 219 (noting requirement of construing state constitution “as a
whole,” and citing both MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 3(2) (addressing qualifications for
attorney general) and MONT. CONST. art.. VII, § 9(1) (addressing qualifications for
justices)).
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constitution “determines minimum eligibility” and “the voters
decide who is qualified to serve.”306
For the dissent, Justice Cotter focused on the word
“practice” and concluded that VanDyke was disqualified
because he was prohibited from “the practice of law in
Montana” while on inactive status.307 The dissent emphasized
the court’s power to establish the qualifications to practice law
in Montana and the ways in which inactive status falls short of
those qualifications; it took the position that VanDyke “cannot
have it both ways.”308 Neither the majority nor the dissent
adopted the plaintiffs’ argument that the delegates to the
constitutional convention of 1972 (presumably including the
plaintiffs themselves) intended to limit supreme-court candidates
only to those who had actually practiced in Montana for five
years so that they would be familiar with Montana law and
procedure.309
D. Financing the Campaign
With the field set, the candidates and allied advocacy
groups began what would become a million-dollar judicial
campaign of national note.310 Surprisingly, however, the amount
of campaign contributions raised by both candidates was below
306. Id. at 222.
307. Id. at 224 (Cotter, Sandefur & McLean, JJ., dissenting). District Judge Dirk M.
Sandefur was sitting for Chief Justice McGrath, and District Judge Edward P. McLean was
sitting for Justice James Jeremiah Shea, who had contributed to the Wheat campaign. See,
e.g., followthemoney.org, supra note 301.
308. Cross, 332 P. 3d at 224 (Cotter, Sandefur & McLean, JJ., dissenting) (explaining
that “[t]he State Bar By-Laws clearly and plainly prohibited VanDyke from practicing law
in Montana while on inactive status,” and that “for over five years VanDyke availed
himself of the benefits of inactive status by paying reduced Bar dues, freeing himself from
the payment of assessments to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, and avoiding the
CLE requirements imposed on active bar members,” and concluding that, “[h]aving done
so, he should be estopped from now asserting that he was admitted to practice law in
Montana during those same five years”).
309. Id. at 221 (quoting IV CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89, at 1119–20); see
also id. at 222 (“The Constitutional Convention record thus supports our analysis of the
plain language of Article VII, Section 9(1)”).
310. See Joe Palazollo, Judges Step Up Electioneering as Outside Money Pours into
Races, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-upelectioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races-1413149643; Dewan, supra note 201;
GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3.
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average for a Montana supreme court race. Due to its relatively
low contribution limits, the Montana campaign stood out for its
candidates’ reliance on small donors, compared with the
dominance of large donors of $1000 or more in most other state
judicial campaigns.311 On the other hand, Montana drew an
exceptional amount of independent spending by national groups
including the Republican State Leadership Committee; the
three-quarters of campaign spending financed by outside groups
was the second-highest share of independent expenditures in any
state supreme court race in 2014.312
1. Fundraising by Van Dyke
Lawrence VanDyke raised $132,999 from about 700
contributors. His support came from a range of interests, with
relatively little support from the bar: twenty-two percent from
lawyers, twelve percent from retirees, ten percent from
agriculture, and five percent from construction, with fifteen
percent of his contributors unidentifiable and four percent of his
contributions self-funded.313 Thirty percent of VanDyke’s
contributions came from outside Montana, the highest rate of
out-of-state contributions for any supreme court candidate on
record.314 He defended these contributions, contrasting the
donors, including former colleagues at Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, who have nothing to gain “personally” from their
contributions, with in-state lawyers who would be appearing
before the court.315

311. See GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3, at 16.
312. Id. at 70.
313. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
314. Id.
315. Jessica Mayrer, Crowding the Race: Partisan Politics, PAC Money Permeate
Supreme Court Campaign, Missoula Independent, Oct. 9, 2014, available at http://
missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/crowding-the-race/Content?oid=2093248. In fact,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher has appeared before the Montana Supreme Court in at least one
major case as both counsel and a party. See Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P. 3d 561, 609, 615
(2007) (affirming $11 million abuse-of-process judgment against Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, one of its lawyers, and his client, including $9.9 million of punitive damages for
what the court called “legal thuggery”).
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The campaign produced ads reinforcing VanDyke’s basic
message, “Following the Law, Not the Politics.”316 In one ad,
the candidate noted voters often asked him, “So are you a
Republican or a Democrat; are you a conservative or a liberal,”
because “people . . . have gotten used to some justices acting
like a partisan official.”317 VanDyke demurred, explaining that
when judges base decisions on their own politics, “[t]hat is
wrong.”318 In its final weeks, the VanDyke campaign responded
to attack ads from what it called “dark money groups” funded by
“the same group of wealthy trial lawyers who have poured
buckets of money into Montana supreme court elections for
decades,” countering those ads by asserting that “Mike Wheat
spent over twenty years as a personal injury lawyer before
starting his partisan political career as a Democrat.”319 The ad
also portrayed Wheat as “anti-gun,” “anti-death penalty,” and
“anti-resource development.”320 In his closing argument,
VanDyke criticized “shadowy groups supported by Montana
trial lawyers,” claiming that “ninety-four percent of money
supporting Mike Wheat is from trial lawyers,” and that “eightythree percent of Mike Wheat’s lawyer donors have recently had
cases in front of him.”321

316. See Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Judges
Shouldn’t Legislate from the Bench, YouTube (Sept. 25, 2014), available at https://youtu
.be/Ysd6TbILnC8 (featuring a soundtrack that concludes with Van Dyke’s campaign
slogan, “Following the Law, Not the Politics”) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; YouTubegenerated transcript on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) ; Lawrence
VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, radio ad, Following the Law, Not the Politics,
YouTube (Sept. 30, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/B_y4-5aB4E4 (accessed Sept. 22,
2015; screen shot of YouTube page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
(no transcript available)).
317. See Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Are you
Republican or Democrat? YouTube (Sept. 8, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/MhzDHV
MgYsw (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; YouTube-generated transcript on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
318. Id.
319. Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Don’t Trust the
Wheaties, YouTube (Oct. 20, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_
iG3xqygA (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; screen shot of YouTube page on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process (no transcript available)).
320. Id.
321. Lawrence VanDyke for Montana Supreme Court, television ad, Nothing Changes if
Nothing Changes, YouTube (Oct. 24, 2014), available at https://youtu.be/IzYiJjwaFvQ.
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2. Fundraising by Wheat
Mike Wheat raised $161,662 from more than 900
contributors. He relied mostly on contributions from lawyers
(fifty-three percent), with the remainder concentrated in the
following sectors: twelve percent from government (including
education) and eight percent from retirees, with five percent of
contributors unidentifiable and five percent of contributions selffunded.322 Only three percent of Wheat’s contributions came
from outside Montana.323 Wheat’s campaign advertising
emphasized his legal experience as a criminal prosecutor and in
private practice, as well as on the supreme court: “It’s important
to elect judges that have plenty of legal experience,” he asserted,
and “[t]he knowledge I gained over the years has helped me
make decisions on the court.”324 As negative advertising by
independent-expenditure groups increased late in the campaign,
however, Wheat leveled his attacks against the messengers,
characterizing them as “[t]hese out of state corporations . . .
distorting the truth about me and my record.”325 Criticism of his
unnamed opponent’s experience was secondary to naming “the
Koch brothers and others who want to buy my seat on the
supreme court for an inexperienced lawyer.”326 His closing
argument was a request to “please vote to retain me, and tell
these corporations that neither your vote nor my seat are for
sale.”327
3. Independent Expenditures for Wheat against Van Dyke
As their campaign advertising suggested, the candidates
became bit players as the election neared. Several state and
national advocacy groups spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
322. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
323. Id.
324. Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time 2014—Montana, Advertisements, http://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2014-montana [hereinafter Buying Time 2014
—Montana] (scroll down to Criminal Prosecutor (Sept. 30, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 22,
2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
325. Id. (scroll down to At It Again (Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 22, 2015; copy of
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
326. Id.
327. Id.
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on mailers and broadcast media, mostly attacking the
candidates.328 The trial lawyers’ Montana Law PAC remained
active in 2014, raising more than $161,483 in disclosed direct
contributions of up to $10,000 each from trial lawyers and law
firms.329 Yet it spent only $36,283 on direct campaign
expenditures, including research, polling, and client letters
supporting Mike Wheat. The PAC transferred most of its
money—$125,200 of in-kind contributions in the form of
payments for broadcast production and purchases—to a new
political committee called Montanans for Liberty and Justice
(MLJ). This group functioned as the new campaign arm for the
Montana Trial Lawyers Association, sharing an office and
officers with the association.330 It self-identified as “a coalition
of groups representing trial lawyers, women, conservationists,
hunters and anglers and human rights advocates.”331 Most of its
funding came from trial lawyers, however, with smaller
contributions from the political committee of the MEA-MFT
public-employee and teachers union.332 In total, MLJ spent
$394,640 on research, polling, consulting, and print and
broadcast campaign advertising, which combined with the inkind contributions from Montana Law PAC, amounted to
$519,840 of independent expenditures on behalf of Mike
Wheat.333 The contributions to MLJ, erroneously called a “dark
money” group by the VanDyke campaign, were disclosed in
nearly all cases down to the individual level, including the
contributions behind the Montana Law PAC’s transfers.334

328. GREYTAK, ET AL., supra note 3, at 53 (“Montana’s 2014 nonpartisan election saw
the highest percentage of negative ads of any race this cycle, with 93 percent of all spots
characterized as negative in tone.”).
329. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
330. Montanans for Liberty and Justice, Form C-2 Statement of Organization, Mont.
Comm’r of Political Practices (Aug. 27, 2014 & Oct. 10, 2014).
331. Charles S. Johnson, Independent Groups Raise Profile of Montana Supreme Court
Race, Missoulian, Oct. 8, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/independentgroups-raise-profile-of-montana-supreme-court-race/article_c85a3734-4e8d-11e4-b633-abf
3456caa6f.html.
332. Montanans for Liberty and Justice, Form C-6 Political Committee Finance Report,
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23, 2014 & Oct. 29, 2014).
333. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
334. Id.
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MLJ ran two television advertisements in the last month of
the campaign. It spent more on television time than the other
independent expenditure groups combined,335 including an
estimated $153,880 on its first commercial, more than three
times the next largest purchase.336 That ad attacked Lawrence
VanDyke as “in the pocket of out of state special interests,” who
worked for a “Washington D.C. lobbying firm that lobbies for
corporate interest groups,” and as someone who has “112 out-ofstate campaign donors.” It then praised Mike Wheat as “his own
man,” “impartial,” and “experienced.” The second MLJ
commercial was an updated version of the first, run in the
closing days of the election.337
Less is known about a third outside group supporting
Wheat. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges filed as an
incidental political committee less than a month before the
election, but did not disclose any contributions or
expenditures.338 It shared an office and officer with a prominent
Montana personal-injury law firm.339 Its one campaign
advertisement, posted online, contrasts Wheat’s practice
experience with an attack against his opponent asking, “Who is
Lawrence VanDyke?”340 The advertisement answers by noting
VanDyke’s relatively short career in Montana, his work as
“[c]orporate lawyer for a California firm Gibson Dunn,” his

335. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (showing that the Republican State
Leadership Committee made $65,360 of television purchases and Americans for Prosperity
made $69,580 of television purchases). (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process).
336. Id. (scroll down to Pocket (Oct. 7, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy of
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
337. Id. (scroll down to Pocket Rev (Oct. 31, 2014) (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy of
storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
338. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges, Form C-2 Statement of Registration,
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 9, 2014).
339. Compare id. with Bishop & Heenan Law Firm, About Us, available at http://
www.heenanlawfirm.com/about-us/ (indicating that John Heenan, who is listed as
Treasurer in the Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges C-2, is a partner at the law firm)
(accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
340. Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges, Lawrence VanDyke, YouTube (Oct. 9,
2014), available at https://youtu.be/RS6a8OYIxW8 (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; transcript on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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support from Gibson Dunn lawyers, and the circumstances of his
departure from the Montana Department of Justice.341
4. Independent Expenditures for Van Dyke against Wheat342
a. The Republican State Leadership Committee
On the other side, the campaign saw the unprecedented
entry of a national political party in a Montana Supreme Court
race. The Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC), “the
only national organization whose mission is to elect downballot, state-level Republican officeholders,”343 registered the
Republican State Leadership Committee—Judicial Fairness
Initiative Montana PAC to support VanDyke and oppose
Wheat.344 Unlike the trial-lawyer groups, the RSLC PAC was
funded almost entirely by lump-sum transfers from its parent

341. Id.
342. One anti-Wheat committee, the anti-abortion group Women Speak Out PAC, is not
addressed in this section. It sent mailers attacking Wheat but did not register or report its
spending, which makes analysis of its involvement in the campaign impossible. See Mike
Dennison, At Least $1.5M Spent on Wheat-VanDyke Race for Montana Supreme Court,
Missoulian, Nov. 26, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/atleast-m-spent-on-wheat-vandyke-race-for-montana/article_7de6d55b-cda1-574e-b16b-beaa
faa719c3.html (reporting that the Women Speak Out group “did not report its spending to
the state Political Practices Office”).
343. Republican State Leadership Committee, About RSLC, available at http://rslc.gop/
about_rslc/ (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). The RSLC is a 527 organization that aggregates contributions and expenditures at
a high level that makes it impossible to trace the funding sources for the Montana Supreme
Court campaign expenditures. In 2014, the RSLC raised more than $38 million from
corporations ranging from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (itself a conduit of
contributions from other corporations) to Blue Cross/Blue Shield to Koch Industries; none
of its major donors are Montanan. Opensecrets.org, Republican State Leadership
Committee: Overview 2014, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail
.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014 (accessed Sept. 23, 2015; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process); Opensecrets.org, Republican State Leadership Committee:
Contributors 2014, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527comtedetail_contribs
.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014. In 2014, it spent more than $10 million on
contributions to state and local candidates, committees, and parties. Opensecrets.org,
Republican State Leadership Committee: Expenditures 2014, available at https://www
.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=050532524&cycle=2014 (all accessed
Sept. 23, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
344. Republican State Leadership Committee, Form C-2 Statement of Registration
(Amended), Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 1, 2014).
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organization in Washington.345 In the Montana Supreme Court
race, it spent a total of $430,263 on mail and broadcast
advertising.346
The RSLC’s first advertisement supported VanDyke as “no
politics, no agenda, all Montana.”347 It opened with a clip of a
report about a “convicted Anaconda rapist granted new trial,”
then asked viewers if they were “tired of stories like these.”348
The advertisement did not cite the case it alluded to, or identify
Justice Wheat or any connection between Wheat and the
“convicted Anaconda rapist.” It made general claims that
VanDyke “is not a politician,” and “will defend our
constitutional rights, protect our property rights, [and] enforce
strict punishment for violent criminals.”349 The second
advertisement was more specific, attacking the judicial record of
“partisan politician Mike Wheat” in connection with two
criminal cases350 in which he joined majority opinions siding
with criminal defendants.351 The advertisement also explained
that “Lawrence VanDyke will protect Montana families.”352
b. Americans for Prosperity
Americans for Prosperity (AFP) was even less transparent
than the RSLC about its funding sources. It reportedly spent
345. Republican State Leadership Committee, Form C-6 Political Committee Finance
Report, Montana Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23, 2014).
346. Id.
347. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Tired of Stories (Oct.
7, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Critical (Oct. 7,
2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
351. One of those decisions—in the case characterized in the RSLC ad as that of the
“Anaconda rapist”—was unanimous but for the partial dissent of one justice, and the other
decision generated only one dissent. See State v. Strong, 236 P. 3d 580 (Mont. 2010)
(including specially concurring opinion by Nelson, J., and dissenting opinion by Rice, J.);
State v. Sage, 235 P. 3d 1284 (Mont. 2010) (including concurring and dissenting opinion
by McGrath, C.J., on one of two grounds for reversal).
352. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Critical (Oct. 7,
2014)) (accessed Sept. 28, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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about $170,000 on television advertising alone,353 but did not
register with or report to the Montana Commissioner of Political
Practices.354 The likely basis for the group’s failure to disclose
would be that it engaged only in “issue advertising,” and did so
prior to the recent enactment of a broader “electioneering
communications” disclosure requirement.355 Such a claim would
be questionable given the text of the advertising and the context
of a judicial election. AFP ran two televised advertisements
against Mike Wheat. The first argues that “Montana deserves a
fair and impartial supreme court,” then claims that Wheat “has a
history of supporting extreme partisan measures.”356 It conflates
four of Wheat’s votes as a state senator with one of his dissents
as a justice, all over a photograph of Wheat in a judicial robe.
The legislative votes concerned new taxes and higher fees, while
the judicial dissent held an environmental assessment of oil and
gas drilling permits insufficient under the Montana
Environmental Policy Act.357 After criticizing the legislative
votes on taxes and fees, the advertisement elides them into the
dissenting judicial votes, characterizing them as “vot[ing] no on
clean burning natural gas, jeopardizing Montana jobs.”358 Most
353. Dewan, supra note 201.
354. Commissioner of Political Practices online records contain no registration or
reports for this expenditure by AFP.
355. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(15) (2015) (defining reportable “electioneering
communications” as paid communication broadly distributed within 60 days of the
initiation of voting in an election that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates in
that election). But the AFP advertisements arguably were reportable even under the broad
definition of campaign expenditures then in effect. See Graybill v. W. Tradition P’ship et al.,
No. COPP-2010-CFP-0016 (Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://politicalpractices.mt.gov
/content/2recentdecisions/GraybillvWTPandCoalitionforEnergyandEnvironmentDecision
(finding that ads characterized by the distributing organizations as “issue ads” were in fact
intended to persuade voters to vote against specific candidates); W. Tradition P’ship v.
Gallik, 2011 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 83, *30 (Dec. 14, 2011) (rejecting constitutional
challenges to disclosure requirement as applied to purported “issue ads,” and noting it
could be argued that mailers painting a candidate in a negative light are advocating for the
defeat of the candidate under Montana law).
356. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Montana Deserves
(Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
357. Id.; see Montana Wildlife Fed. v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 280 P.3d 877,
894 (Mont. 2012) (Wheat & Morris, JJ., dissenting on procedural grounds).
358. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to Montana Deserves
(Oct. 27, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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implausibly, it ends with a tactic borrowed from legislativecampaign issue ads by asking the viewer to “call Mike Wheat
and tell him to keep his partisan politics out of our supreme
court,” and providing the court’s phone number as if to invite ex
parte public comment on cases before the court.359 The second
AFP advertisement is more sophisticated in its attempt to
compare Senator Wheat’s votes in the legislature with Justice
Wheat’s votes on cases involving taxes, property rights, and
energy development, but again ends with a request to call the
court and “tell Mike Wheat to keep his extreme politics out of
the Montana Supreme Court.”360
c. Montanans for a Fair Judiciary
Montanans for a Fair Judiciary entered the campaign late. It
described itself as campaigning by radio and mail for “a more
stable and business-friendly Supreme Court,” and was led by a
former Executive Director of the Montana Republican Party.361
It disclosed spending about $60,000 raised from a handful of
individual contributions (more than half of the total from out-ofstate donors), with most of its money consisting of transfers
from other PACs in the banking, construction, energy, and realestate sectors.362 One of its mailers, supporting VanDyke as
“fair, honest and impartial,” landed in Wheat’s mailbox.363

359. Id.
360. Buying Time 2014—Montana, supra note 324 (scroll down to How Do the Votes
Compare? (Oct. 28, 2014)) (accessed Sept. 29, 2015; copy of storyboard on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
361. Johnson, supra n. 331.
362. Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form C-2 Statement of Organization (Amended),
Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 16, 2014); Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form
C-6 Political Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 23,
2014) (listing $15,000 contribution from Contractors’ PAC and $5,050 of individual
contributions from Montana); Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, Form C-6 Political
Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Nov. 24, 2014) (listing
$30,000 total of contributions from Montana Prosperity PAC and $5,500 of individual
contributions from Connecticut and Texas); Montana Prosperity PAC, Form C-6 Political
Committee Finance Report, Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices (Oct. 22, 2014) (listing
$24,500 of contributions from the Montana REALTORS PAC, Montana Gas & Oil PAC,
Montanans for Affordable Housing PAC, Montana Bankers PAC, and the Cloud Peak
Energy Employee PAC).
363. Mayrer, supra note 315.
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5. The Close of the Campaign
a. The Debate
By the time the four candidates for two associate justice
seats met for a candidate forum at the University of Montana on
September 23, 2014, the advertising campaign had not yet
reached its peak.364 Still, questions of campaign finance took
center stage in the debate between Wheat and VanDyke.
Wheat opened by framing his perspective on “what this
race really is all about. . . . how our court may be under attack
from out-of-state money, from out-of-state corporations who
want to come into this state and influence who’s going to be on
the court.”365 Citing a report that the national Republican Party
intended to spend $5 million campaigning in judicial races,
Wheat said that “[w]e have to be vigilant,” as outside money
“starts pecking away at what we all want—fair, independent and
impartial justices.”366 VanDyke responded that voters should
have their “hypocrisy filter on,”367 citing independent spending
by trial lawyers in prior judicial elections.368 He estimated that
the trial-lawyer PAC again would spend hundreds of thousands
of dollars in the campaign, saying that “[t]he issue is whether or
not the trial lawyers are going to be the only ones who are
spending money.”369 For VanDyke this was an issue of “freespeech rights of organizations to say what they believe.”370 “If
someone says they’d shut down speech, be skeptical,” he
argued, “it’s a huge problem telling people what they can and
can’t say.”371 Wheat, on the other hand, criticized Citizens
364. The author served as moderator of the candidate forum.
365. John S. Adams, Supreme Court Candidates Square off in Missoula, Great Falls
Tribune, Sept. 24, 2014, available at http://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/news/local/
2014/09/23/supreme-court-candidates-square-missoula/16135685/.
366. Martin Kidston, Montana Supreme Court Candidates Debate Funding, Partisanship,
More at UM, Missoulian, Sept. 24, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/local/
montana-supreme-court-candidates-debate-funding-partisanship-more-at-um/article_94637
b28-439a-11e4-ae18-77d63833d048.html.
367. Id.
368. Adams, supra note 365.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Kidston, supra note 366.
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United and sided with his colleague and fellow candidate Justice
Jim Rice, who argued that “[t]he state of Montana has a
compelling interest in protecting and preserving a fair and
impartial judiciary.”372
b. The Retired Justices’ Commentary
Meanwhile, seven former Montana Supreme Court justices
published a broadside against independent expenditures in
newspapers across the state, claiming that “our civil justice
system is at stake,”373 and that “Citizens United empowered
organizations with opaque, feel-good names to pour significant
amounts of dark money into judicial elections.”374 Citing studies
on the impact of campaign finance on judicial behavior, the
retired justices pointed out that “the amount of expenditures and
contributions to judicial races correlates directly with how a
benefiting justice votes on cases.”375 Although the version in
print did not mention any candidate, the justices clearly
appeared to target Van Dyke’s support from outside spending.
They began their concluding paragraph with a line that could
have served well in a campaign advertisement: “Montanans
deserve fair, impartial, independent and non-partisan judges and
justices elected by Montana voters—not political hacks, bought
and paid for by out of state dark money.”376 In a subsequent
interview, former Justice James Nelson called it “political
372. Id.
373. James C. Nelson, et al., Will Montana Judges Be for Sale? Missoulian, Sept. 25,
2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/opinion/columnists/will-montana-judges-befor-sale/article_2c81d34e-44c4-11e4-8b97-8b098cd6b8d6.html (containing no mention of
Van Dyke, but indicating that the other justices sponsoring the broadside included Terry
Trieweiler, Jim Regnier, Bill Leaphart, Bill Hunt, John Sheehy, and John Warner); see also
Troy Carter, Ex Justices Say Candidate for Supreme Court a Corporate Puppet, Bozeman
Chronicle, Oct. 17, 2014, available at http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/
politics/ex-justices-say-candidate-for-supreme-court-a-corporate-puppet/article_0e4fc104-5
58d-11e4-8401-636fb002328c.html (indicating that the version of the broadside distributed
to newspapers may have referred to Van Dyke by name).
374. Nelson, et al., supra note 373 (referring to “opaquely named conservative
organizations headquartered in Washington, D.C.,” and calling out the Republican State
Leadership Committee and Americans for Prosperity by name).
375. Id. (referring to studies published by two progressive-leaning research groups, the
American Constitution Society and the Center for American Progress).
376. Id.
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hypocrisy for VanDyke or his supporters to call Wheat a
partisan judge.”377 Former Justice Terry Trieweiler praised
Wheat and warned that “VanDyke’s election would totally shift
the balance on the court in the direction of right-wing activism
in total service of the corporate agenda,” and that
“[e]vironmental laws, consumer protection laws and labor laws
are all at risk.”378 VanDyke dismissed the criticism, claiming
that
all of the former justices who have criticized me in this race
have extensive ties to the Trial Lawyers, . . . [t]he
organization of wealthy lawyers that for decades has been
spending huge sums of money to get justices on the court
who will make sure they get big attorney fee awards,
379
whether they deserve it or not.

c. The Research Mailer
Just as the campaign was winding down to its final days, a
new and surprising voice emerged. A mysterious mailer, the
2014 Montana General Election Voter Information Guide,
appeared featuring the official Great Seal of the State of
Montana, but with an attribution of “[p]aid for by researchers at
Stanford University and Dartmouth College.”380 The mailer
contained columns for both “Nonpartisan Supreme Court
Justice” races, and under each contained a continuum from
“More Liberal” to “More Conservative,” with Barack Obama
and Mitt Romney positioned near each end, respectively.381
Under the Wheat-VanDyke race, the mailer put Wheat slightly
to the (more conservative) right of Obama and Vandyke slightly
to the (more conservative) right of Romney.382 The mailer was
sent to 102,780 registered voters in Montana, approximately
377. Carter, supra note 373.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. McCulloch v. Stanford and Dartmouth, No. COPP 2014-CFP-046, Decision
Finding Sufficient Facts to Demonstrate a Violation of Montana’s Campaign Practice
Laws, at Exhibit (May 11, 2015) (also noting—in small print—that “[t]his guide is nonpartisan and does not endorse and candidate or party” and that it “was created as part of a
joint research project at Stanford and Dartmouth”).
381. Id.
382. Id.
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fifteen percent of the state electorate.383 After a flood of
complaints to state election officials, the Presidents of
Dartmouth and Stanford sent a remarkable apology “to the
voters and citizens of Montana,” explaining that the mailer was
not affiliated with or endorsed by the State of Montana despite
its inclusion of the state seal.384 Instead, it was “part of an
academic research study,” publishing to voters a comparison of
candidates based on “public information about who had donated
to each of the campaigns” in order “to determine whether voters
who are given more information are more likely to vote.”385 The
Montana Commissioner of Political Practices, however, found
the mailer to be an independent expenditure subject to campaign
finance disclosure, given that its purpose was to influence the
election by affecting voter turnout.386
d. Total Expenditures
By the end of the campaign, estimates put the total
spending for the Wheat-VanDyke race at around $1.6 million,
making it the most expensive judicial race in state history.387
Wheat had $780,981 spent on his side, including $162,658 in
direct contributions, plus allied independent expenditures of
$519,840 from the trial-lawyer-led coalition Montanans for
Liberty and Justice, $62,200 of support from Montana Lawyers
for Experienced Judges, and $36,283 (net of transfers) from the
traditional trial-lawyer Montana Law PAC.388 Nearly all of these
funds were disclosed and originated in-state, mostly from
lawyers.389 VanDyke had approximately $794,081 spent on his
side, including $133,818 in direct contributions, plus allied
independent expenditures of $430,263 from the Republican
383. Id. at 7.
384. Id. at Exhibit.
385. Id.; see also Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 367 (2014) (describing the methodology of mapping ideology based on campaigncontribution records). No results of the research study have been published, and as the
letter of apology asked Montana voters to ignore the mailer, it seems unlikely that the study
generated any useful data.
386. McCulloch, No. COPP 2014-CFP-046, at 18–19.
387. See Dennison, supra note 342.
388. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
389. Id.
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State Leadership Committee, at least $170,000 from Americans
for Prosperity, and about $60,000 from Montanans for a Fair
Judiciary.390 These numbers are less precise because only the
one-quarter of total campaign funding coming from the
VanDyke campaign and Montanans for a Fair Judiciary
provided full political committee disclosure of contributors; the
contributors of the remaining amount (approximately $600,000)
were not disclosed. Presumably it originated almost entirely
from out-of-state sources, given the dominant national funding
sources for the RSLC and AFP.391 After nearly $300,000 in
candidate contributions and $1.3 million in independent
expenditures, the money race between Wheat and VanDyke
ended in a draw.
E. The Election and Its Aftermath
In the June primary only one-third of registered voters
turned out despite the primaries in both Congress and U.S.
Senate races.392 Then, three-quarters of primary voters cast a
ballot in the supreme court race and Wheat won with sixty-two
percent of the vote.393 A poll from early October showed Wheat
leading VanDyke twenty-five percent to thirteen percent, with
sixty-two percent undecided.394 By the time Election Day
arrived on November 4, early voting had been ongoing for a
month.395 Turnout was low by Montana standards—fifty-five
percent of registered voters in a non-gubernatorial year.396 Yet
390. Id.
391. See notes 343 & 354, supra.
392. Dennison, supra note 342.
393. Montana Secretary of State, 2014 Statewide Primary Election Canvass, available at
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2014/2014-Primary-Official-Statewide-Canvass.pdf (accessed
Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) Wheat swept
every county but one, rural Powder River County, where he lost by seven votes. Id.
394. Mike Dennison, Montana’s Hottest Race May Be for State Supreme Court,
Missoulian, Nov. 1, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/
montana-s-hottest-race-may-be-for-state-supreme-court/article_609d8176-0993-5b09-ac38
-5df9b9bc1823.html.
395. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-205 (requiring ballots to be “available for absentee
voting at least . . . 25 days prior to election day”).
396. Montana Secretary of State, Montana Voter Turnout (1920-2014), available at
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/Voter_Turnout/index.asp (indicating that “Montana consistently
has had one of the highest voter turnout rates in the nation” and that turnout in the 2012
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ballot roll-off was lower than usual for judicial campaigns,397
with eighty-eight percent of general-election voters casting a
ballot in the Wheat-VanDyke race.398 The heavy campaigning
had a demonstrable if minor impact on name recognition; the
quieter—and more lopsided—race between Justice Jim Rice and
the relative unknown David Herbert drew only eighty-one
percent of voters who cast a ballot.399 The heavy campaigning
had a less demonstrable impact on persuading voters to choose
Wheat or VanDyke: Wheat won the election with fifty-nine
percent of the vote, a move of just three points in favor of
VanDyke since the primary.400 Wheat won thirty-five of fifty-six
counties, with VanDyke leading only in rural counties.401
Justice Wheat took office for the third time in five years in
January, 2015. After his appointment in 2010, election in 2010
for the remainder of that term, and re-election in 2014, he will
serve a full eight-year term through December 2022. A month
after the election, VanDyke again took office as a state solicitor
general, this time in Nevada.402 There he will work for the
state’s new Attorney General, Adam Laxalt, a Republican who
won with the support of the Republican State Leadership
Committee.403

and 2010 general elections was seventy-two percent and fifty-six percent, respectively)
(accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
397. Judicial elections experience an average ballot “roll-off” of around one quarter of
voters who select candidates in the top races but do not cast votes for judicial candidates;
higher campaign spending reduces ballot roll-off. See Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W.
Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State
Supreme Court Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457 (2008).
398. Montana Secretary of State, 2014 Statewide General Election Canvass, available at
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2014/2014-General-Official-Statewide-Canvass.pdf (accessed
Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
399. Id.
400. Id.; see also text accompanying note 393, supra.
401. Id.
402. Associated Press, Ex-Montana Solicitor General Taking Post in Nevada,
Missoulian, Dec. 10, 2014, available at http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/exmontana-solicitor-general-taking-post-in-nevada/article_bb0d1a91-2691-5254-9af0-2d6249
11d9a8.html.
403. Id.
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V. LESSONS FROM MONTANA
What most distinguished the Wheat–Vandyke campaign is
the extent to which the candidates and their allies openly aired
usually subliminal questions of campaign finance, partisanship,
and related issues. These questions never became the exclusive
center of attention. Conventional themes of biography,
experience, and values pervaded the campaign. Staple
controversies around criminal justice and natural resources also
played their part.404 But little mention was made of several
controversies that emerged in other states. For example, in 2012
the Montana Supreme Court rejected by a four-to-three vote a
state constitutional claim for same-sex civil unions on
procedural grounds, with Justice Wheat joining a dissent that
would have recognized spousal benefits for same-sex couples.405
Unlike in other states, the issue went largely unnoticed in the
judicial campaign. Similarly, in the months before the election
two well-publicized cases involving punitive damages
challenged the constitutionality of the state law capping those
damages; the court heard argument in one of the challenges at
the height of the campaign in September.406 Again, however, tort
reform was not a major issue in the campaign, except as an

404. GREYTAK, supra note 3, at 48 (“[O]ver half the spots that aired in 2013–14 (both
positive and negative) related to whether candidates were ‘tough on crime.’”); id. at 43
(characterizing Wheat–VanDyke campaign as “Big Business Clashes with Environmental
Interests”).
405. See Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2012) (indicating that Justice
Wheat joined the dissent of Justice Cotter); see also id. at 375 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
406. See, e.g., Vince Devlin, Polson Judge Reduces Damage Award to $73M in Crash
that Killed Missoula Cousins, Missoulian, Sept. 23, 2014, available at http://missoulian
.com/news/local/polson-judge-reduces-damage-award-to-m-in-crash-that/article_2162da6c4285-11e4-a2cc-2b338b9819a1.html; Associated Press, Montana Supreme Court Hears
Arguments in Jury Award Cap Case, Missoulian, Sept. 27, 2014, available at http:/
/missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/montana-supreme-court-hears-arguments-in-juryaward-cap-case/article_4f9ce400-4685-11e4-86ce-9f65a9e381d5.html. The argued case, in
which the court did not reach the punitive-damages issue, is Masters Group Int’l, Inc. v.
Comerica Bank, 352 P.3d 1101 (Mont. 2015). The other case was settled on appeal before
briefing. See Olsen v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DA 14-0500, Stipulated Motion to Dismiss
(Jan. 14, 2015), available at supremecourtdocket.mt.gov (enter case number into search
box to see docket sheet indicating that case was dismissed on January 14, 2015 upon filing
of a stipulated motion to dismiss) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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implication behind questions around campaign financing by trial
lawyers and corporations.
There is reason to believe that campaign finance is an
especially salient political issue to Montana voters. The colorful
history of corporate corruption in Montana at the turn of the
twentieth century, which remained a powerful force shaping the
1972 Constitutional Convention, remerged after Citizens United
and American Tradition. In 2012, Montanans overwhelmingly
approved initiative I-166, the “Prohibition on Corporate
Contributions and Expenditures in Montana Elections Act,” by a
margin of nearly three to one.407 The law is almost entirely
symbolic,408 and establishes as state policy that
each elected and appointed official in Montana . . . advance
the philosophy that corporations are not human beings with
constitutional rights and that each such elected and
appointed official is charged to act to prohibit, whenever
possible, corporations from making contributions to or
expenditures on the campaigns of candidates or ballot
issues.409

The same election saw the state attorney general who litigated
Citizens United and American Tradition, Steve Bullock, win the
race for governor, but only after his opponent took advantage of
an election-eve invalidation of state contribution limits to accept
a $500,000 donation before the limits were reinstated on
appeal.410 More recently, several Montana legislators rebuffed

407. Montana Secretary of State, 2012 Statewide General Election Canvass, available at
http://sos.mt.gov/elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf (showing (343,549 votes for
and 116,554 against) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
408. Johnstone, supra note 244, at 22–26.
409. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-503.
410. Charles S. Johnson, Voter Reaction to Hill’s $500k Donation Could Determine
Montana Governor’s Race, Missoulian, Oct. 20, 2012, available at http://missoulian.com/
news/state-and-regional/voter-reaction-to-hill-s-k-donation-could-determine-montana/article
_467e5fb4-1b1e-11e2-ad85-001a4bcf887a.html . The money’s source turned out to be the
Republican Governor’s Association, a national affiliate of the Republican State Leadership
Committee that shares many of its corporate donors. See Missoulian State Bureau,
Republican Governor’s Association Source of Hill’s $500K Donation, Missoulian, Oct. 25,
2012,available athttp://missoulian.com/news/local/republican-governors-association-source
-of-hill-s-k-donation/article1340ba48 -1ee8 -11e2-86d6-001a4bcf887a.html; Opensecrets.org,
Republican Governor’s Association: Contributors 2014, available at https://www.open
secrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=113655877&cycle=2014 (including some
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efforts by Americans for Prosperity to defeat a Medicaid
expansion in the 2015 Legislature, a backlash that brought
several legislators to support major disclosure reforms to state
campaign-finance law.411 This history makes Montana a
particularly uninviting target for what Montanans might
consider to be out-of-state dark-money groups.
Notwithstanding its distinctive history, however, Montana
may hold lessons for campaigns and elections in other states.
Those lessons include some applicable specifically to judicial
campaigns and elections. Any reforms to judicial elections must
recognize and work around the challenges to judicial-election
exceptionalism presented by the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment doctrine. As discussed in Part IV(A) above, these
challenges culminate in the impact of unlimited independent and
partisan expenditures under the rationale of Citizens United.
That impact overwhelms the marginal protections offered by
remaining regulations of judicial conduct in political campaigns,
and even the ultimate backstop of due process in the most
extreme cases. Once policymakers acknowledge the limited
efficacy of these specific judicial election reforms given the
primacy of independent expenditures, several ordinary
campaign-finance reforms emerge as workable responses to the
current role of money in judicial elections.
A. Background: Challenges to Judicial-Election Exceptionalism
The Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White412 emphasized the principle that judicial elections are not
politics-free contests. Its holding that “the First Amendment
does not permit [a state] to achieve its goal by leaving the
principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from
discussing what the elections are about,”413 clarified that
of the RSLC donors mentioned in note 343, supra) (accessed Oct. 5, 2015; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
411. See, e.g., Charles S. Johnson, Late-Night Soul-Searching Pushed Garner to
Forefront of Dark Money Fight, Missoulian, Mar. 29, 2015, available at http://missoulian
.com/news/state-and-regional/late-night-soul-searching-pushed-garner-to-forefront-of-dark/
article_0532cdfd-f5de-5171-813c-e98db825f449.html.
412. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
413. Id. at 788.
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freedom of speech protections apply fully to judicial speech. In
dissent from the invalidation of an “announce clause” that
prohibited judicial candidates from expressing views on
particular legal issues, Justice Ginsburg predicted that
candidates would express commitments on issues “to win
votes.”414 And Justice Stevens opined that “the judicial
reputation for impartiality and open-mindedness is compromised
by electioneering that emphasizes the candidate’s personal
predilections rather than his qualifications for judicial office.”415
It has not turned out quite that way. As the Wheat and Van Dyke
campaigns demonstrated, judicial candidates still campaign on
impartiality. Before electorates with any diversity of views,
public commitments on particular issues can backfire because
they compromise the image of a candidate’s impartiality and
undermine candidates’ attacks on their opponents for supposed
partiality. So judicial candidates campaign in code, as they
always have, counting on proxies to recognize and advertise on
the issues that win voters. Hot-button topics need not be debated
by the candidates because they can leave arguing them to their
allied independent expenditure groups, which face no ethical
constraints on their characterizations of opposing candidates.
Despite the hopes of its majority and fears of its dissenters,
Caperton v. Massey416 presents no general solution to concerns
about judicial-campaign finances. It recognized a due process
problem “when a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing
the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”417
While the rule as stated may appear to have significant
applications in judicial campaigns, the facts of the case suggest
that its practical scope may be limited to nearly unheard-of
incidents involving a single contributor who funds “more than
the total amount spent by all other [of the candidate’s]
supporters and three times the amount spent by [the candidate’s]

414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. at 820 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
Id. at 884.
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own committee.”418 The dissenting justices were not reassured
by these limits. In his dissent of forty questions, Chief Justice
Roberts asked, for example, “What about contributions to
independent outside groups supporting a candidate?” and “What
if the ‘disproportionately’ large expenditure is made by an
industry association, trade union, physicians’ group, or the
plaintiffs’ bar?”419
The following year, Citizens United distinguished these
questions in form: “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule
that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political
speech could be banned.”420 But in practical terms, Citizens
United answered them.421 Its deregulation of independent
expenditures, and the subsequent proliferation of networked
“outside groups” and “industry associations” engaged in
campaign spending, makes an anachronism of the direct,
disclosed, and overwhelming contributions at issue in Caperton.
Now big donors hoping to influence the work of the courts enjoy
a range of national and state-based conduits for campaign
spending that are practically impossible to track for a litigant
who might later have grounds for a recusal motion.422
418. Id. at 873.
419. Id. at 893, 894 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
420. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
421. See Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 611–15 (2011) (arguing that the distinction between Citizens United and
Caperton in their treatment of independent expenditures is unpersuasive); but see James
Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending
and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Survey Am. L. 727 (2011) (arguing for a distinction from
Citizens United for judicial campaigns based on Caperton’s treatment of judicial-campaign
expenditures as “contributions”).
422. The Montana Supreme Court itself has recognized the impracticality of recusal
based on electoral consequences. In Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455
(Mont. 2012), the court heard a constitutional challenge to a referendum that would place
the justices in seven districts for election. Several legislators who supported the referendum
intervened, and sought the recusal of four justices who were not currently standing for
election but might have stood for re-election in the future because the referendum would
have disqualified from re-election any sitting justice who did not relocate to his assigned
district. Id. at 463. The court held that the justices were “potential” candidates whose
reelection bids “could possibly” be hindered by the referendum, and that there was
therefore no “actual evidence of bias, prejudice, or unethical conduct on the part of any
justice or judge sitting” on the case. Id. at 471. If possible disqualification from re-election
to judicial office is insufficient to trigger “actual evidence of bias” justifying recusal, it
would seem that large campaign contributions by litigants likely will be insufficient too, at
least if they are funneled through intermediaries into independent expenditures.
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Recusal under Caperton is impracticable in a post-Citizens
United regime in which particular interest groups, and even
particular litigants, are able to aggregate and route large
campaign expenditures through a shell game of trade
organizations and political committees. The primitive Caperton
tactic of direct expenditures is naive in a world of campaignfinance conduits like Americans for Prosperity, the Republican
State Leadership Committee, and home-grown interlocking
super PACs like Montanans for Liberty and Justice and
Montanans for a Fair Judiciary. If a latter-day Copper King
wanted to elect a latter-day Judge Clancy, there would be no
need for direct contributions or even corporate independent
expenditures. Instead, he could run his corporation’s treasury
funds into a trade organization like America’s Natural Gas
Alliance, through a like-minded national committee like the
Republican State Leadership Committee, and into a state
affiliate like the Judicial Fairness Initiative Montana PAC.
Similarly, though more transparently, a trial lawyer with a major
punitive damages award on its way to the Montana Supreme
Court might write a big check to the Montana Trial Lawyers
Association to fund its Montana Law PAC, knowing that most
of his funds would transfer to an affiliate like Montanans for
Liberty and Justice. Either the industrialist or the litigator could
hedge his bets with more direct PAC contributions to a singlecandidate super PAC, signaling his interest in the campaign to
related committees that might then double down on the race, and
also signaling his support to the candidate. Short of a simply
enormous transfer of $1,000,000 straight through the
committees and into the campaign, none of these maneuvers is
likely to draw scrutiny under Caperton. Nor are they likely to
satisfy ordinary recusal standards, given the nature of
“independent” expenditures and the aggregation of any one
donor’s contributions with those made by others.
Just as Caperton is no match for the flood of independent
expenditures authorized by Citizens United, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Williams-Yulee v. State Bar of
Florida,423 which presented a challenge to a prohibition against
a judicial candidate’s personal solicitation of campaign
423. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
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contributions or endorsements, seems likely to have little effect
in the present environment.424 Consistent with the logic of
Citizens United, the vast majority of money spent in the Wheat
and VanDyke campaigns was in the form of independent
expenditures that could not have been solicited by the
candidates. As the 2014 Montana campaign demonstrated, no
matter how a candidate raises $150,000, the campaign message
will be delivered four times more loudly by independent
expenditures of $600,000. In Williams-Yulee, only Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, addresses a
possible distinction between campaigns for judicial office and
Citizens United’s theory that “[i]t is in the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those
policies.”425
B. The Primacy of Independent Expenditures
The crucible of campaign finance in Montana between
2010 and 2014 established the primacy of independent
expenditures in judicial campaigns. The series of cases from
White to Caperton to Williams-Yulee might suggest significant
shifts in the landscape arising from the Supreme Court’s
decisions of issues specific to judicial campaigns. Montana’s
experience suggests, however, that no development in the
constitutional law of judicial campaigns has had as much impact
as Citizens United and its narrowing of the corruption interest so
424. It is possible that the Court has opened a path to limit the reach of Citizens United
in judicial elections with its recognition in Williams-Yulee that “a State has compelling
interests in regulating judicial elections that extend beyond its interests in regulating
political elections, because judges are not politicians.” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672.
425. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–74 (Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. F.E.C., 540 U.S.
93, 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Perhaps this potential
limitation of Citizens United’s reach is a development that the dissenting justices in
Williams-Yulee anticipate by their surprising lack of reliance on Citizens United. See
Williams-Yulee at 1682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011); and United States v. Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)); see also id. at
1684 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) and White). Justice Alito’s dissent did not cite a case. See id. at
1685.
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as to exclude concerns about undue influence arising from
unlimited independent expenditures. Citizens United not only
reached judicial elections (through American Tradition) with
little consideration of the consequences of that extension, but it
also played a crucial role in the invalidation of the partisan
endorsement and expenditure ban for judicial elections in
Sanders County Republican Central Committee.426 That broke
the barrier between national party treasuries and state judicial
campaigns, adding to the flood of outside money.
In short, Citizens United preempts White because
candidates need not worry about public campaign promises once
private money starts lining up. Citizens United trumps Caperton
because no form of due process or recusal practicably can sift
out a sophisticated litigant’s independent expenditures, and—at
least according to the reasoning of Citizens United—
independent expenditures can no longer corrupt. And Citizens
United overwhelms Williams-Yulee because, in the judicial
campaigns that matter most, neither candidates nor supporters
rely on direct contributions given the ease and efficacy of
indirect independent expenditures.
The chart on the following page427 details the primacy of
independent expenditures after Citizens United. The Wheat–

426. 698 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012).
427. All data in the chart are from Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182, and are
inflation-adjusted to 2014 dollars. The Chart excludes both uncontested races and
noncompetitive campaigns of candidates who raised less than ten percent of the amount
raised by the winning candidate.
Information relevant to particular campaigns:
An asterisk (*) denotes the winner of a particular race.
In 2002, the Montana Law PAC reportedly spent $150,000 (nominal) toward two
candidates, but only one race was contested; all of that amount is allocated as spent on
behalf of candidate William Leaphart.
In 2012, the Montana Growth Network disclosed spending $42,000 to support candidate Laurie McKinnon in the primary, but later reported on a tax form spending $687,720
on public education mailings and advertising, likely in the form of campaign-related “issue
ads” targeting judicial and legislative candidates; based on the group’s emphasis on the
judicial campaign in the primary and a $50,000 transfer to American Tradition Partnership—which targeted McKinnon’s opponent Sheehy in a mailing—half of that amount is
allocated as spent on behalf of McKinnon. It is not known how much the Montana Growth
Network ultimately targeted for the race between Laurie McKinnon and Ed Sheehy, but
even a conservative estimate of the share dedicated to the judicial race pegs it as a major
factor in the 2012 campaign.
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VanDyke campaign was the most expensive on record only
because of independent expenditures and related election
spending. Indeed, the candidates themselves raised relatively
small amounts of campaign contributions by historical standards
for contested races. Only Justice Nelson’s defense of a seat in
2004 came close to the 2014 campaigns.
Financing of Contested Montana Judicial Campaigns: 1990-2014

1990 J Greely
1990 J Trieweiler*
1992 CJ Trieweiler
1992 CJ Turnage*
1996 J Erdmann
1996 J Regnier*
2000 Ja Cotter*
2000 J Renz
2000 J Tweeten
2000 CJ Gray*
2000 CJ Trieweiler
2002 J Eddleman
2002 J Leaphart*
2004 Ja Nelson*
2004 Ja Younkin
2004 Jb McLean
2004 Jb Morris*
2008 CJ McGrath*
2008 CJ Waterman
2010 J Baker*
2010 J Swandal
2012 J Best
2012 J McKinnon*
2012 J Sheehy
2014 J VanDyke
2014 J Wheat*
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C. Ordinary Campaign-Finance Reforms
for Judicial Campaigns
Because Citizens United matters to judicial campaigns in
the same way it matters to all political campaigns, there are
common responses to it. These include improved campaignfinance disclosure, especially of electioneering communications
and conduit organizations; recalibrating contribution limits to
draw more fundraising directly to candidate campaigns without
significantly increasing corruption concerns; and reconsidering
public financing for judicial campaigns. Eliminating judicial
campaigns, a solution proposed by many frustrated with recent
In 2014, the Republican State Leadership Committee reported independent
expenditures on behalf of candidate Lawrence VanDyke, but received most of its
contributions as an opaque transfer from its national affiliate.

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MONTANA

125

campaign-finance developments, is a last resort that may not
resolve the most important concerns about political influence in
judicial selection. The trend toward increased amounts of money
in judicial campaigns presents the challenge of undue influence,
but also presents an opportunity to revisit the ways in which
campaign finance law can mitigate, or at least not aggravate, that
trend.
1. Effective Campaign-Finance Disclosure
Campaign-finance disclosure law should embrace Citizens
United’s validation of electioneering communication
disclosure.428 This empowers state law to reach campaigntargeted advertising, like the Americans for Prosperity
commercials attacking Wheat, that may currently evade
disclosure by avoiding appeals to vote for or against a candidate.
More broadly, Citizens United’s endorsement of disclosure in
general enables states to consider more robust application of
disclosure requirements to conduit organizations like the
Republican State Leadership Committee’s Montana-based PAC,
which disclosed little more than a massive contribution from its
parent organization’s aggregation of corporate funds. Improved
disclosure is important not because it enables recusals at the
courthouse—though it may in extreme cases—but because it
enables rejoinders on the campaign trail. Revealing the money
behind a candidate raises consciousness of factions, giving
voters an opportunity to check such special interests on the
ballot.429 On both sides of the Wheat–VanDyke campaign, the
candidates and even the super PACs used campaign-finance
disclosure to make each side’s financial supporters a central
issue in the campaign. It would have been difficult to develop a
clearer referendum on Montana trial lawyers versus out-of-state
corporations than those interests themselves provided in the
2014 campaign.

428. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (“[W]e reject Citizens United’s contention that the
disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.”)
429. See Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 413, 443–49 (2012).
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Another element of effective campaign-finance disclosure
is higher disclosure thresholds. This reform could be particularly
important in judicial campaigns, where the smart money may sit
idle in thousands of lawyers’ and clients’ pockets for fear that a
contribution could unconsciously or consciously affect a
candidate’s judgment in a future case. A little of that idle
money, aggregated across thousands of potential contributors,
could boost the influence of constituents who know the
candidates best and counter the impact of independent
expenditures by outside interests. Relatively low disclosure
thresholds—like the thirty-five dollar trigger in Montana, which
applies regardless of the size of the constituency or donor
base430—discourage such retail-level campaign contributions
without significant benefits in preventing corruption. Judicial
campaigns already start with relatively narrow donor bases that
leave candidates dependent on a few large donors willing to
contribute to either their campaigns or their allied PACs. In a
million-dollar campaign, an anonymous (or reported but not
disclosed) contribution of a hundred dollars will go unnoticed,
but enough of them will go a long way toward countering the
effects of outside spending.431
2. Recalibrated Contribution Limits
Montana has relatively low contribution limits.432
Independent expenditures, including many made by the same
contributors who make the maximum contribution allowed to a
candidate campaign, render these limits less effective. First, they
make it more difficult for a candidate to raise enough funds to
counter attacks funded by independent expenditures. Second,
they divert contributions away from disclosed, accountable
candidate campaigns toward sometimes opaque, less
accountable independent expenditure groups. In Montana a

430. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-229(2).
431. See Anthony Johnstone, The System of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 99 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 143, 159–60 (2014).
432. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (2014); see also Lair, 798 F.3d at 748–49
(remanding for reconsideration of whether those limits are constitutional). See generally
Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217
(2014).
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typical supreme court candidate has a base of between 500 and
1000 contributors (a number that may increase if the law raises
disclosure thresholds).433 In 2014, a candidate in a contested
election could accept $320 in the primary election and another
$320 in the general election.434 A judicial candidate can raise a
few hundred thousand dollars assuming that many contributors
give the maximum amount; this means that, at most, a
candidate’s leading contributors could take credit for a fraction
of one percent of the candidate’s fundraising total. A modest
increase in contribution limits would be large enough to enable a
judicial candidate to respond to the new scale of independent
expenditures but still small enough to prevent any one donor or
group from taking credit for the candidate’s campaign. This
would pose few additional corruption concerns, especially
compared to the current alternative of diverting unlimited
contributions to single-candidate super PACs. An increased
contribution limit can channel larger contributions back toward
candidates and away from independent expenditures.
3. Public Financing for Judicial Campaigns
One of the most important ideas to come out of Montana’s
1972 Constitutional Convention, in concept if not in law, is
limited public financing of judicial elections. Any new proposal
for public financing must take care not to limit expenditures435
or penalize candidates who self-fund or benefit from
independent expenditures.436 A proposal also must minimize the
risk of strategic behavior by candidates looking to exploit public

433. Campaign-Finance Dataset, supra note 182.
434. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 44.10.338(1) (2014) (limiting contributions to $320 per
election for supreme court candidates in 2014).
435. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (invalidating limits for
independent expenditures, a candidate’s expenditures from his or her own personal funds,
and overall campaign expenditures).
436. See Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating so-called
“millionaires amendment” lifting contribution limits for candidates facing self-funded
opponents); Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, ___ U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (invalidating matching funds for publicly financed candidates that
were triggered by opponents’ spending and that of independent-expenditure groups).
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financing.437 Preserving an independent judiciary, an original
purpose of judicial elections, may justify the public expense
necessary to finance judicial candidate campaigns. As delegates
argued in 1972, there are significant distinctions between
judicial campaigns and other political campaigns;438 these
differences might draw even those opposed in general to public
financing of elections to support it for judicial elections.
4. Abolishing Judicial Elections
There is a final option that would be unthinkable for other
elective offices: abolish judicial elections. As ambitious as
disclosure and public financing may be, this is likely the least
realistic response to Citizens United’s impact on judicial
elections. Voters have not surrendered their power to elect
judges for decades.439 For some, the world after Citizens United
demands abolition now more than ever. Consider, for example,
former Justice James Nelson, who dissented in Western
Tradition while decrying Citizens United. He once defended
judicial elections as practiced in Montana, writing in 2010 that
“[t]he elected judges and justices with whom I am familiar make
decisions based on the facts and the law as they see it, regardless
of whose ox is gored in the process,” and also noted that “a
judicial election decided on the basis of one unpopular decision
is relatively rare.”440 His own experience had been that
“Montanans want nonpartisan judges and will not elect
candidates who fail that threshold test,” and, he pointed out,
“Montana, with its severe campaign-contribution restrictions,
has not faced the sort of buy-a-judge problems that have
437. Under current Montana law, for example, candidates (or their allies) have an
incentive to recruit a primary challenger so as to double the contribution limits. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(5) (2015) (“If there is a contested primary, then there are two
elections to which the contribution limits apply.”).
438. See generally CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 89; CONVENTION
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 90.
439. Rhode Island was the most recent state to change from judicial elections to merit
selection, in 1994. See, e.g., Nat’l Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection in the States:
Rhode Island, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?
state=RI (accessed Oct. 7, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
440. James C. Nelson, Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for
This and Future Generations, 71 MONT. L. REV. 299, 310 (2010).
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poisoned elections in states where there are sky-is-the-limit
individual and corporate contributions.”441 But as Citizens
United impacted campaigns, including the 2014 judicial
campaign in Montana, Nelson turned sharply against judicial
elections. Not only does the threat of independent expenditures
discourage qualified attorneys from running for judicial office,
Nelson now argues, but the promise of independent expenditures
encourages unqualified candidates to run.442 As a result, Nelson
now argues for a constitutional amendment establishing “a
purely merit-based system” by a selection committee of
designated legal and civic leaders.443 Other jurists, like former
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, opposed judicial elections well
before Citizens United,444 and she continues to oppose them
today.445
In light of the origins of judicial elections in arguments
leading to the 1889 Montana Constitution, and the concerns
about judicial appointments expressed around the 1972 Montana
Constitution, we might be careful what we wish for. The
“Missouri Plan” of merit selection still requires retention
elections that, as Iowa’s experience shows, are also susceptible
to campaigns that threaten to compromise judicial integrity.446
Appointive systems without retention elections may free judges
441. Id. (footnote omitted)
442. James C. Nelson, It’s Time to Make a Change in Selecting Judges in a Post
Citizens United World, 40 MONT. LAWYER 21, 21 (Feb. 2015) (also acknowledging that he
had “always been a strong proponent for electing Montana’s judges and justices,” but
announcing that he had changed his mind because “[i]t is clear from this last election cycle
that campaigns for Montana's Supreme Court—and, potentially, other State judicial
offices—will henceforth be characterized by huge expenditures of dark money, attack ads,
misleading mail stuffers, and the involvement of out of state money and organizations—all
directed to the end of influencing Montana’s elections and buying a seat or seats on the
Court”).
443. Id.
444. See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a problem
with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the
practice of popularly electing judges.”).
445. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor & Institute for the Advancement of the American
Legal System, The O’Connor Judicial Selection Plan (2014) (providing for merit selection,
gubernatorial appointments, performance evaluations, and non-partisan, no-opponent
retention elections); Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. Times, May
22, 2010, at WK9.
446. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Retention Redux: Iowa 2012, 14 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 47 (2013) (contrasting two sets of Iowa retention elections).
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of the burden of elective politics, but at the cost of concentrating
those politics on the elected officials responsible for the
selection. A critic of Citizens United—on grounds that undue
influence is far more pervasive than the Supreme Court
acknowledged in that decision—must also recognize that
appointive selection concentrates that influence on the appointer.
The federal model of executive appointment and legislative
confirmation for life terms only raises these political stakes,447
and would raise them even more for state judges whose general
jurisdiction and common law powers allow them a far greater
impact on state electorates than their federal counterparts. To
use the hydraulics metaphor sometimes applied to campaign
finance,448 it seems safe to say that, like water or money,
political influence will find its way through any judicialselection landscape.
VI. CONCLUSION
State courts, no less than federal courts, pose critical
questions of independence and accountability under the rule of
law. There is no one right answer to those questions for all
jurisdictions. Montana’s answer reflects a territorial suspicion of
outside influence, a progressive-era concern about corporate
corruption, and an extraordinarily deep deliberation among
ordinary citizens about competing models for judicial selection
in the formation of its 1972 constitution. The result is a hybrid
model sharing elements of contested election, retention election,
merit, and (with strong gubernatorial representation on the
nominating commission) straight appointment models. After the
invalidation of its partisan-endorsement prohibition, Montana
now also shares some elements of a partisan-election model, for
better or worse.
447. See, e.g., John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial
Appointments Process under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
1, 3 (2003) (referring to “confirmation battles over judicial nominees” and “a dramatic
slowdown of the confirmation process for federal judges”).
448. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999) (“Money, like water, will seek its own level.
The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled flood damage elsewhere. . . . The
money that reform squeezes out of the formal campaign process must go somewhere.”).
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As in other states with similar models of judicial elections,
Montana’s model is being tested by a new normal in politics.
More than any other recent development, Citizens United
disrupted the traditional practice of judicial elections in
Montana. The Montana Supreme Court itself invited the justices
to consider the implications of that case for judicial elections in
Western Tradition, but the United States Supreme Court
declined. In the aftermath, corporate expenditures, super PACs,
dark money, and even national political parties flooded
Montana’s relatively small supreme court campaigns with
exactly the sort of out-of-state corporate influence Montanans
had fought against for the last 150 years. This prompted a
vigorous public debate, in the context of the campaign between
Mike Wheat and Lawrence VanDyke, about the Montana
Constitution and Citizens United, the influence of trial lawyers
and corporations, and the merits of electing judges at all. The
campaign did not settle that debate, of course. Instead, it raised
old questions about judicial selection in a new era of campaign
finance. In 2014, as in 1864, 1889, 1972, and 2010, and in
Montana as in its sister states, those questions continue to call
for answers.

